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Abstract
We develop a monetary model that incorporates Over-the-Counter (OTC) asset trade. After
agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects
their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely, money. Subse-
quently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets
and, thus, boost their liquidity, or to buy assets and, thus, provide liquidity to other agents.
A unique feature of our model is that inflation affects welfare not only through the traditional
channel, i.e., through determining equilibrium real balances, but also through influencing agents’
entry decisions in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on
welfare, asset prices, and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which pre-
dict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare
improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose
on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision.
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1 Introduction
In most developed economies, the majority of asset trade takes place in over-the-counter (OTC)
markets.1 OTC markets are decentralized in at least two dimensions: First, agents who wish to
sell assets in such markets need to find buyers (and vice versa); second, the terms of trade are
negotiated between the involved parties and depend, not only on fundamentals, such as the agents’
valuation for the asset, but also on other characteristics, such as their impatience or the degree
to which they have access to outside options. It is precisely for these reasons that the recent the-
oretical literature on OTC asset markets, initiated by the seminal work of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and
Pedersen (2005), has used the standard search-theoretic model as a workhorse.
The motivation for this paper stems from two well-known facts, one from the recent OTC asset
market theory and one from the more well-established labor search theory, which have not been
combined in the literature until now, mainly because of the lack of an adequate framework. First,
one of the main motives for trade in OTC markets is liquidity, i.e., a large fraction of agents who
sell assets in these markets do so in order to acquire money, which they can then use to purchase
consumption goods.2 But since the cost of holding the liquid asset is controlled by monetary pol-
icy, it is reasonable to presume that monetary policy also crucially affects the need of agents to
trade in OTC markets, or, to borrow the search theory jargon, the agents’ entry decisions in these
markets. The second fact that motivates this study is that in search models where agents face an
entry decision, this decision will be socially suboptimal because agents fail to internalize a search
externality that they impose on one another when they choose to enter the market and search for
trading partners (Hosios (1990)). These two facts taken together suggest that monetary policy
could affect economic outcomes and welfare, not only through the traditional channel identified in
monetary theory, i.e., the determination of equilibrium real balances, but also through influencing
the entry decisions of agents in OTC markets, which, in turn, could mitigate (but also worsen) the
inefficiency implied by the aforementioned externality.
To formalize these ideas, we develop a model that incorporates OTC asset trade within the
tractable framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). Agents carry a portfolio that contains money,
which is the sole medium of exchange (MOE) in the economy, and an asset that cannot be used
to purchase consumption, but delivers a real dividend, if held to maturity. However, agents do
not have to hold this asset to maturity. After choosing their money holdings, agents receive an
idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the liquid asset.
Subsequently, agents who may find themselves short of liquidity can visit a secondary OTC market,
characterized by search and bargaining, as in Duffie et al. (2005), where they can sell the illiquid
1 For the United States, Neklyudov and Sambalaibat (2015) report that the fraction of the aggregate asset trade
volume that took place in OTC markets was around 87% in 2010.
2 In Duffie et al. (2005), and in most of the literature that follows this paper, gains from trade stem from the fact
that different agents have a different valuation for the same asset. The authors clearly imply that this is a convenient
assumption, a short cut, that one does not need to take literally, and they provide a number of deeper trading motives
that this assumption is meant to capture. Of all the possible justifications they offer, the first one (and we believe
that the order certainly ascribes importance) is liquidity, in the same context as the one described above.
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asset (before maturity) for cash. In contrast, agents who realize (ex post) that they have a low
valuation for cash can enter the OTC market as buyers of assets, or, equivalently, providers of liq-
uidity. Hence, in our model, monetary policy affects not only the equilibrium real balance holdings
of agents, but also the very composition of agents who demand and supply assets in OTC markets.
More precisely, in our model agents wish to consume a good which is traded in a decentral-
ized market (distinct from the OTC asset market) characterized by imperfect commitment and
anonymity. These frictions render a MOE necessary, and only money can play this role. After
agents’ money holdings decisions are sunk, an idiosyncratic shock determines each agent’s valua-
tion for the good, and we assume that this valuation can be low, normal, or high. Since money is
the only MOE, the shock that affects agents’ valuation for the good also affects (isomorphically)
their valuation for the liquid asset. In equilibrium, agents with the low valuation always enter the
OTC market as buyers of assets (or liquidity providers), and agents with the high valuation always
enter as sellers of assets (or liquidity seekers). However, the “normal types”, have a non-trivial
decision to make, i.e., they choose whether they will enter the OTC as buyers or sellers of assets,
and this decision critically affects welfare since it influences the number of matches among the
various types. An important ingredient of our model is a matching technology that captures the
idea that agents will try to avoid the more congested side of the market.
As is standard in monetary theory, in our model too, higher inflation decreases equilibrium
real balances. What is unique to our model is that different rates of inflation and, hence, different
levels of real balance holdings, correspond to different (optimal) entry decisions by normal types.
Intuitively, higher inflation depresses real balances and makes these agents more desperate for extra
liquidity, thus, more willing to enter the OTC market as sellers of assets. We characterize the rep-
resentative agent’s optimal behavior and find that there exist critical levels of inflation, say γL , γH ,
with γL < γH , such that the following hold true: If the inflation rate exceeds γH all normal types
enter the OTC market as sellers, but if the inflation rate is lower than γL all normal types enter
the OTC market as buyers. For inflation rates within (γL , γH ), the fraction, Σ, of normal types
who enter the market as buyers satisfies Σ ∈ (0, 1) and is strictly decreasing in the rate of inflation.
An almost universal result in monetary theory is that an increase in inflation will hurt welfare:
Inflation acts as a tax on real balances, hence, any increase in this tax induces agents to hold less
money, which, in turn, reduces the quantity of goods they can afford. In our paper, this may not
be true, and the reason can be explained in an intuitive way. As is standard in any model that
features an entry decision in a search market, this decision will typically be suboptimal because it
is made by (profit maximizing) agents who ignore the effect of their own entry on other agents’
chances of meeting trading partners. If the buyer’s bargaining power in the OTC is very high,
too many (compared to the socially efficient level) normal types enter that market as buyers to
take advantage of the favorable terms of trade. A higher inflation can generate a lower number of
buyers in the OTC, thus, “correcting” the aforementioned inefficiency/externality. We show that,
for certain parameter values, this positive effect can dominate over the traditional negative one (the
tax on real balances), so that an increase in inflation can ultimately increase welfare. While welfare
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may be increasing within a certain range of inflation rates, the Friedman rule is still optimal.
The model also allows us to study asset prices in the OTC market, and how these prices are
affected by monetary policy. Equilibrium prices are lower than the dividend the asset would deliver
if held to maturity, because sellers, by definition, are in need of liquidity, hence, willing to sell assets
at a “haircut”, which is decreasing in their bargaining power. Since agents with the high valuation
for consumption are the ones who also value the extra liquidity more, asset prices will be lower in
meetings where the seller is of the high (as opposed to the normal) type. Furthermore, we find that
a higher inflation typically decreases asset prices because it depresses equilibrium real balances and
makes sellers more willing to give away their assets at a cheaper price. As pointed out by Lagos
and Zhang (2015), such a negative relationship between asset prices and the nominal interest rate
(i.e., the holding cost of money) is well-documented in the data and often considered anomalous.3
That paper also offers a theoretical justification for this observation. In their model, agents have a
different valuation for the asset per se, and money allows agents with a high valuation to buy the
asset from those with a low valuation in an OTC market. Thus, the negative relationship between
asset prices and the nominal interest rate stems from the fact that money and assets are comple-
ments. In our model, the asset is effectively a substitute to money, because agents can sell it in the
OTC market for money. However, an increase in the holding cost of money reduces equilibrium
real balances and makes agents more willing to sell assets at a lower price.
Lastly, we examine the effect of inflation on the OTC market trade volume, which is often
regarded as one of the most crucial indices of market liquidity. Generally, the OTC trade volume
consists of the intensive margin, i.e., the trade volume within any given meeting, and the extensive
margin, i.e., the measures of the various types of meetings, which depend on the entry decisions
of the normal types. On the intensive margin, a higher inflation reduces real balances and causes
agents to rely more heavily on the money that they acquire by selling assets in the OTC. Hence, a
higher inflation tends to increase the need for trade in the OTC, but this does not always translate
into a higher trade volume: If inflation is too high, asset sellers wish to acquire large amounts
of liquidity, but asset buyers can simply not provide that much liquidity, because they are not
carrying enough. Further, our earlier discussion reveals that the effect of inflation on the extensive
margin is not relevant for extreme levels of inflation (i.e., outside the range (γL , γH )). Hence, for
rates of inflation that are either too low or too high, only the intensive margin effect is relevant,
and trade volume will be increasing (decreasing) for low (high) levels of inflation. For intermediate
levels of inflation the extensive margin becomes relevant, and the effect of an increase in inflation
on that margin may well be of the opposite sign than that on the intensive margin. As a result, the
aggregate trade volume is always increasing for low levels and decreasing for high levels of inflation,
but, in between, it can exhibit non-standard or exotic shapes, such as a double hump-shape.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that studies how asset liquidity affects equilibrium
prices. A non exhaustive list includes Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007), Ferraris and
3 Lagos and Zhang (2015) also point out that this observation forms the basis for the so-called “Fed Model” of
equity valuation, which is popular among financial practitioners.
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Watanabe (2011), Jacquet and Tan (2012), Nosal and Rocheteau (2013), Andolfatto and Martin
(2013), Rocheteau and Wright (2013), Venkateswaran and Wright (2013), Andolfatto, Berentsen,
and Waller (2014), Geromichalos, Lee, Lee, and Oikawa (2015), Han, Julien, Petursdottir, and
Wang (2016), and Johnson (2016). Lagos (2010) shows that a model in which assets can help
agents facilitate trade in frictional markets can be key to rationalizing the equity premium puzzle.
More recently, Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer (2013) show that asset liquidity can also
help explain the term premium of long-term bonds, within a model where assets have only indirect
liquidity properties because agents can sell them in a secondary market for money. Other recent
papers also incorporate secondary asset market trade within a monetary search model. Examples
include Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2012), Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2014), Trejos
and Wright (2014), Lagos and Zhang (2015), Mattesini and Nosal (2015), and Geromichalos and
Jung (2015). Our paper is the first among this literature to introduce OTC market entry decisions
and to study how inflation can affect these decisions and, consequently, welfare.
Our paper is also related to the large literature on OTC financial trade, initiated by Duffie et al.
(2005), which includes, among many others, Weill (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Lagos and
Rocheteau (2009), Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011), Chiu and Koeppl (2011), Afonso and Lagos
(2015), and Chang and Zhang (2015). The notion of entry into a market characterized by search
frictions is not new, and it is carefully studied by Hosios (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). However, in this “labor search” literature, the entry decision is always made by a firm that
contemplates whether entering the market and searching for workers is profitable. The novelty of
our model is that it considers the agent’s choice to enter on either side of the market. We believe
that this is especially relevant in asset markets. For instance, an agent who owns two houses (a
similar argument applies to financial assets) can enter the housing market to either sell a house or
buy another one. And, importantly, this decision crucially depends on whether the agent is facing
a “seller’s” or a “buyer’s” market, which is precisely what is going on in our model.
As already discussed, the majority of monetary models predict a negative relationship between
inflation and welfare, because a higher inflation amounts to a higher tax on real balances. Our
model is an exception to this rule, but not the only one (for an exhaustive list see Section 6.9 of
Nosal and Rocheteau (2011)). Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2005) and Rocheteau, Weill, and
Wong (2015) show that a positive inflation can have a welfare-improving role through distributional
effects. Furthermore, Bethune, Choi, and Wright (2015) consider a model with local buyers, who
are informed about sellers’ prices, and “tourists”, who are uninformed, and show that a deviation
from the Friedman rule can be optimal, because a higher inflation taxes more heavily the more
expensive tourist shops. Finally, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) study a model with free entry of
(goods) sellers under alternative market structures, and show that the Friedman rule achieves effi-
ciency at the intensive, but not at the extensive margin, thus, an increase in inflation may improve
welfare. While our framework also predicts a positive relationship between inflation and welfare,
within a subset of inflation rates, the channel that gives rise to this result, i.e., the effect of inflation
on asset market participation decisions, is completely novel and unique to our model.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the physical environment. Section 3 an-
alyzes the agent’s optimal behavior. Section 4 defines and characterizes equilibrium, with a focus
on the effects of inflation on welfare, asset prices, and trade volume. Section 5 concludes.
2 Physical Environment
Time is discrete with an infinite horizon. Each period consists of three sub-periods where differ-
ent economic activities take place. During the first sub-period, a financial market opens, which
resembles the OTC market of Duffie et al. (2005). We refer to this market as the OTC market.
In the second sub-period, agents visit a decentralized market for goods, as in Lagos and Wright
(2005), where bilateral and anonymous trade takes place. We refer to this as the LW market. In
the third sub-period, economic activity takes place in a traditional Walrasian or centralized market.
This market, which can be thought of as a settlement market, is referred to as the CM. A detailed
description of these markets will follow. There are two types of economic agents, consumers and
producers, depending on their role in the LW market. All agents live forever and their types are
permanent. The measure of both types is normalized to the unit.
All agents discount the future between periods (but not sub-periods) at rate β ∈ (0, 1). Con-
sumers consume in the second and the third sub-periods and supply labor in the third sub-period.
Their preferences are given by U(X,H, q), where X,H stand for consumption and labor in the CM,
respectively, and q is consumption in the LW market. Following Rocheteau (2012), we assume that
the typical consumer’s LW utility function is given by εiu(q), i ∈ {L,N,H}, where εL < εN < εH ,
and, for simplicity, we set εL = 0, i.e., consumers who receive the “low” shock do not wish to
consume in the LW market. This idiosyncratic preference shock is realized at the beginning of each
period, and it is i.i.d. across periods and agents. We refer to the different types of consumers as L,
N , and H-types (low, normal, and high valuation agents, respectively). Producers consume only in
the CM, and they produce in both the CM and the LW market. Their preferences are described by
V(X,H, q), where X,H are as above, and q represents units of the LW good produced. Interpreting
the CM as a pure liquidity or settlement market, we adopt the functional forms
U(X,H, q) = X −H + εiu(q),
V(X,H, h) = X −H − c(q).
We assume that u is twice continuously differentiable with u(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′(0) =∞, u′(∞) = 0.
For simplicity, we set c(q) = q, but this is not crucial for any results. Let q∗i ≡ {q : εiu′(q∗i ) = 1},
∀i ∈ {N,H}, i.e., q∗i denotes the optimal level of production in a meeting between an i-type
consumer and a producer in the LW market. Clearly, we have q∗
H
> q∗
N
, and, trivially, q∗
L
= 0.
In the third sub-period, all agents consume and produce a general good or fruit. Agents have
access to a technology that transforms one unit of labor into one unit of the fruit. Following,
Mattesini and Nosal (2015), we assume that in the third sub-period of each date, t, each consumer
is endowed with A units of a real asset. Each unit of the asset delivers one unit of fruit in the
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CM of t + 1 and then “dies”. Note that the owner of the asset in period t + 1, and claimant to
its dividend, need not be the original owner, as agents may choose to sell their assets in the OTC
market of t + 1. The second asset in our model is fiat money. Money is traded in the CM, and
we let ϕt denote its price (which agents take as given). Money supply is controlled by a monetary
authority and evolves according to Mt+1 = (1+γ)Mt, with γ > β−1. New money is introduced, or
withdrawn if γ < 0, via lump-sum transfers to consumers in the CM. Money is durable, divisible,
and recognizable by all agents, i.e., it possesses all the properties that make it appropriate to serve
as a MOE in the LW market. Recall that the real asset cannot serve as a MOE in that market.4
In our framework, it is the consumers who make all the interesting economic decisions (as it is
shown in Rocheteau and Wright (2005), producers in these types of models will typically not want
to leave the CM with positive money holdings). Thus, hereafter we refer to consumers simply as
“agents”, and we reserve the terms “buyer” and “seller” to denote the role of an agent in the OTC
market. We now explain the motives of agents to trade in that market.
As already mentioned, after leaving the CM agents receive a shock that affects their valuation
of LW consumption. L-types do not desire to consume in the LW market, but since they chose
their money holdings before they knew their type, they may find themselves holding money that
they will not use in the current period. On the other extreme, H-types have a high valuation for
the LW good and, hence, for money, but they may find themselves short of liquidity. Hence, in
equilibrium, L-types will always enter the OTC market as liquidity providers/asset buyers, and
H-types will always enter that market as liquidity seekers/asset sellers. Unlike the extreme types
whose decision is trivial, N-types can choose to enter the OTC market either to sell assets (to
L-types) or to buy assets (from H-types). To capture search frictions and other trade limitations
in OTC markets, we assume that there is only one round of trade, and each N -type can enter as
a buyer or a seller, but not both. This choice, which is central in our analysis, depends on the
OTC market microstructure, the typical N-type’s money holdings (her need for liquidity), and,
importantly, her belief about other N-types’ entry decisions. Let µi denote the measure of agents
who receive the shock εi, i = {L,N,H}, so that µL + µN + µH = 1. To keep notation simple, we
assume that µH = µL = µ, and we further require that µ < 1/3, implying that µN = 1−2µ > 1/3.5
Once the entry decision of N -types has been made, and the pools of buyers and sellers in
the OTC have been determined, a matching technology, described in detail in Section 2.1, brings
together buyers and sellers of assets in pairwise meetings. Within each meeting, the involved
parties bargain over the quantity of assets to be transferred from the seller to the buyer and the
cash payment to be made from the buyer to the seller. Any surplus generated within the match
is split between the parties according to the proportional bargaining solution of Kalai (1977), with
λ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the seller’s bargaining power.
4 For a discussion on the possible micro-foundations behind this assumption, see Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck
(2012), Rocheteau (2011), and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012).
5 This assumption guarantees that the measure of the agents who make the interesting OTC entry decision, i.e.,
the N-types, is sufficiently large. It turns out that if µN < 1/3, then either all N-types enter the OTC market as
sellers or they all enter as buyers, regardless of their beliefs about other N-types’ entry decisions. We consider this a
less interesting type of equilibrium, and assuming that µN > 1/3 guarantees that it will not be the only one.
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The second sub-period is the standard decentralized market of Lagos and Wright (2005). N -
type and H-type agents meet with producers in a bilateral fashion and negotiate over the terms
of trade. Due to anonymity and imperfect commitment exchange has to be quid pro quo and, as
we have already discussed, only money can serve as means of payment. In this framework, all
the interesting results emerge from agents’ interaction in the OTC market. To that end, we keep
the LW market as simple as possible and assume that all (N and H-type) agents match with a
producer, and they make a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer.
2.1 Matching Technology in the OTC Market
After the idiosyncratic uncertainty has been resolved, N -types choose whether to enter the OTC
market as buyers or sellers. We let σ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which the representative
N -type chooses to enter as a buyer. This agent believes that other N -types choose to be buyers
with probability Σ ∈ [0, 1], and we will explore the existence of Nash equilibria in which Σ = σ.
Given the N -types’ behavior, summarized by Σ, the total measure of buyers and sellers in the
market is given by µB = µ+ ΣµN and µS = µ+ (1− Σ)µN , respectively.
A straightforward way to model the matching process would be to follow Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) and adopt a standard, CRS matching function m(µB , µS ), which brings together
buyers and sellers in an “unbiased” way.6 As we show in Appendix A.1, under this specification,
the representative N -type’s entry choice is not affected by her belief, Σ, about other N -types’
strategies. Thus, depending on parameter values, either all the N -types enter the OTC as buyers
or they all enter as sellers. We consider this an undesirable feature. For instance, consider an
investor who can enter an OTC market either to buy or to sell assets. It is natural to assume that,
if the investor expects the market to be flooded with sellers, she will have a strong incentive to
enter as a buyer, and vice versa.
The main issue with the standard Mortensen-Pissarides matching function is that here the
groups of buyers and sellers are heterogeneous. To deal with this issue, we build on Blanchard and
Diamond’s (1994) idea of “matching with ranking”. In that paper, there is heterogeneity on one
side of the market (workers). The authors assume that a high type worker is only congested by
other high types and not by low types, but a low type worker is congested by both types. In a
sense, high types get to match first, which aims to capture the (very reasonable, we think) idea that
the other side of the market (firms) searches harder for these types. In similar spirit, we want to
adopt a matching technology such that within the group of buyers (sellers) the L-types (H-types)
get to match first, since every agent on the other side of the market prefers to meet the type whose
LW good valuation is as far away as possible from her own (because this type of meeting involves
the maximum possible surplus).
Unfortunately, we cannot use Blanchard and Diamond’s (1994) matching technology “off the
6 By “unbiased” we mean that the probability with which a seller meets an L-type or an N -type buyer depends
only on the relative fraction of these agents in the pool of buyers, and the same is true about the probability with
which a buyer meets an N -type or an H-type seller. For instance, if 2/3 of the buyers are L-types and 1/3 are
N -types, then, conditional on the fact that a seller meets a buyer, the probability that this buyer is an L-type is 2/3.
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shelf” either, because in our model the participants on both sides of the markets are heterogeneous.
To that end, we propose a matching technology which is inspired by, but not identical to, the one
developed by Blanchard and Diamond (1994). The matching process evolves in two stages. In the
first stage, only H and L-types get to match, since these types are more desirable trading partners
for buyers and sellers of assets, respectively. The total number of matches in the first stage is a
function of the (common) measure of L and H-types, µ, and given by mHL = νmin{µ, µ} = νµ.
Assuming that matching is imperfect, i.e., ν < 1, a measure (1 − ν)µ of H-types, and an equal
measure of L-types, remain unmatched by the end of the first stage. In the second stage, the un-
matched L and H-types can no longer match with each other, but they can match with the N -types
who are on the other side of the market. Assuming the same matching technology as above, the
total number of matches between H and N -types is mHN = νmin{(1 − ν)µ,ΣµN }, and, likewise,
the total number of matches between N and L-types is mNL =νmin{(1− Σ)µN , (1− ν)µ}.
Given the description of the matching process, it is now straightforward to calculate the arrival
rates of different trading partners to each market participant. Let piij denote the probability with
which an i-type agent matches with a j-type, i, j = {L,N,H}.7 Since piij is equal to the total
measure of matches between i and j-types divided by the measure of i-types, we have:
piHL = ν, (1)
piHN = ν(1− ν) min
{
1,
Σ
d
}
, (2)
piLH = ν, (3)
piLN = ν(1− ν) min
{
1,
1− Σ
d
}
, (4)
piNL = νmin
{
1,
d
1− Σ
}
, (5)
piNH = νmin
{
1,
d
Σ
}
, (6)
where we have defined d ≡ (1− ν)µ/µN , and d < 1, due to the assumption that µ < 1/3.
The derivation of equations (1) and (3) is straightforward. In Appendix A.1, we show in detail
the derivation of equation (2). The derivation of (4), (5), and (6) follows identical steps. It is
important to highlight that the proposed matching technology not only gives rise to some very
straightforward arrival rates, but also captures the idea that the measure of N -types on each side
of the market critically affects the matching probability of the typical N -type and, hence, her
entry decision. For instance, inspection of equation (6) reveals that the matching probability of an
N -type who enters the OTC as a buyer is decreasing in the total measure of N -type buyers, Σ.
7 For instance, piHN is the probability with which an H-type matches with an N -type (who chose to be a buyer),
piNL is the probability with which an N -type (who chose to be a seller) matches with an L-type, and so on.
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3 Value Functions and Optimal Behavior
3.1 Value Functions
We begin with the description of the value functions in the CM. Consider an agent who enters the
CM with money and asset holdings (m, a) ∈ R2+. For this agent the Bellman equation is given by
W (m, a) = max
X,H,mˆ
{X −H + βE {Ω(mˆ)}}
s.t. X + ϕmˆ = H + ϕ(m+ γM) + a,
where hats denote next period’s choices, and E is the expectations operator. The function Ω
captures the OTC market value function, described in detail below. Replacing for the agent’s net
consumption, X −H, from the budget constraint into the objective function allows us to write
W (m, a) = ϕ(m+ γM) + a+ max
mˆ
{−ϕmˆ+ βE {Ω(mˆ)}} . (7)
As is standard in models that build on the Lagos-Wright framework, the optimal choice of mˆ is
independent of m (no wealth effects) and the CM value function is linear in all its arguments. We
collect all the terms in (7) that do not include the state variables m, a, and we write
W (m, a) = ϕm+ a+ Υ, (8)
where the definition of Υ is obvious.
Next, consider the CM value function for a producer. As we have already discussed, this agent
will never leave the CM with positive money (or asset) holdings, but she may enter the CM with
some money that she received as payment in the preceding LW market. It is straightforward to
show that the producer’s CM value function is also linear, and, in particular,
WP (m) = ϕm+ βV P ≡ ΥP + ϕm, (9)
where V P denotes the producer’s value function in the next period’s LW market.
After leaving the CM, and before the OTC opens, agents learn their type i = {L,N,H}.
Therefore, the expected value for an agent who carries m units of money before she enters the OTC
market is given by
E {Ω(m)} = µ ΩL(m) + µ ΩH (m) + µN ΩN (m), (10)
where Ωi(m) is the OTC value function for the i-type agent, i = {L,N,H}. In the OTC market,
H-types are always sellers and L-types are always buyers.8 The interesting decision is made by
N -types who are free to choose which side of the market they wish to join. In any meeting between
a buyer of type i = {L,N} and a seller of type j = {N,H}, let χij ≥ 0 denote the units of assets
8 This is a result rather than assumption. For instance, an L-type would never enter the OTC as a seller, since
there is no possible trade involving a sale of assets by an L-type (for money) that can generate a positive surplus.
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that the seller transfers to the buyer and δij ≥ 0 the units of money that the buyer pays to the
seller. These terms will be determined through bargaining in Section 3.2. We have:
ΩL(m) =piLH VL (m− δLH , A+ χLH ) + piLN VL (m− δLN , A+ χLN )
+ (1− piLH − piLN ) VL (m,A) , (11)
ΩH (m) =piHL VH (m+ δLH , A− χLH ) + piHN VH (m+ δNH , A− χNH )
+ (1− piHL − piHN ) VH (m,A) , (12)
where the various probabilities, piij , are described in equations (1)-(4), and Vi , i = {L,H}, denotes
the i-type’s value function in the LW market. The N -type’s value function is slightly more involved,
since this agent is also making a non-trivial entry decision. We have
ΩN (m) = max
σ∈[0,1]
{
σ [piNHVN (m− δNH , A+ χNH ) + (1− piNH )VN (m,A)]
+ (1− σ) [piNLVN (m+ δLN , A− χLN ) + (1− piNL)VN (m,A)]
}
, (13)
where piNL and piNH are described in (5) and (6), respectively, VN is the N -type’s LW market value
function, and σ is the probability with which this agent enters the OTC as a buyer.9
Lastly, consider the value functions in the LW market. Let qi denote the quantity of good
produced for the i-type agent, and pi the payment, in monetary units, made by that agent to the
producer. These terms will be determined in Section 3.2. The LW market value function for the
i-type agent who enters that market with portfolio (m, a) is given by
Vi(m, a) = εiu(qi) +W (m− pi, a). (14)
Notice that, trivially, VL(m, a) = W (m, a), since the L-type moves on directly to the CM. The LW
value function for a producer (who enters with no money or assets) is simply V P = −qi +WP (pi).
We can now proceed to the description of the terms of trade in the LW and OTC markets.
3.2 Terms of Trade in the LW and OTC Markets
We start with the easier LW market bargaining problem. Consider a meeting between a producer
and an i-type agent, i = {N,H}, with portfolio (m, a). The two parties bargain over the quantity,
qi, and the total monetary payment, pi, and the i-type agent makes a TIOLI offer, maximizing
her surplus subject to the producer’s participation constraint and the cash constraint. Hence, the
bargaining problem is given by
max
pi,qi
{εiu(qi) +W (m− pi, a)−W (m, a)} ,
9 Clearly, an N -type who enters as a buyer only trades in the event of meeting an H-type, and an N -type who
enters as a seller only trades in the event of meeting an L-type (no surplus is generated and, hence, no trade takes
place in a meeting between two N -types).
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subject to −qi +WP (pi)−WP (0) = 0, and pi ≤ m. Substituting the value functions W and WP
from (8) and (9) into these expressions simplifies the bargaining problem to
max
pi,qi
{εiu(qi)− ϕpi} ,
subject to qi = ϕpi, and pi ≤ m. The solution to this bargaining problem is as follows.
Lemma 1 Define the amount of money that, given the price ϕ, allows the type-i agent to purchase
q∗i as m
∗
i ≡ q∗i /ϕ. Then, the solution to the bargaining problem is given by qi(m) = min{ϕm, q∗i }
and pi(m) = min{m,m∗i }.
Proof. This result is standard in these types of models. Therefore, the proof is omitted.
The solution has a straightforward interpretation. The only relevant variable is agent i’s money
holdings. If she carries m∗i or more, the first-best quantity q
∗
i will always be exchanged, but if
m < m∗i , the i-type does not have enough cash to induce the seller to produce q
∗
i . In that case, the
cash constrained i-type will give up all her money, pi(m) = m, and the quantity, qi, will be set such
that the producer’s participation constraint is satisfied with pi(m) = m, which implies qi = ϕm.
Next, consider a meeting in the OTC market between a buyer of type-i, i = {L,N}, with
money holdings m˜, and a seller of type-j, j = {N,H}, with money holdings m. Recall that, by
assumption, both of these agents carry A units of the asset as they enter the OTC. The OTC
bargaining problem between these agents can be expressed as
max
δij ,χij
{
Vj
(
m+ δij , A− χij
)− Vj (m,A)}
s.t.
λ
1− λ =
Vj
(
m+ δij , A− χij
)− Vj (m,A)
Vi
(
m˜− δij , A+ χij
)− Vi (m˜, A) .
Exploiting equation (14) and Lemma 1, the problem can be re-written as10
max
δij ,χij
{
εj
[
u
(
ϕ(m+ δij )
)− u (ϕm)]− χij}
s.t.
λ
1− λ =
εj
[
u
(
ϕ(m+ δij )
)− u (ϕm)]− χij
εi
[
u
(
qi
(
m˜− δij
))− u (qi(m˜))]+ χij − ϕδij − ϕpi (m˜− δij)+ ϕpi(m˜) ,
where the terms qi(.) and pi(.) are described in Lemma 1.
The solution to this bargaining problem is described in the following lemma.
10 The careful reader may have noticed that the numerator in the right-hand side of the constraint contains
the term ϕ(m + δij ) inside u, while the analogous expression in the denominator contains the more general term
qi
(
m˜− δij
)
= min{ϕ (m˜− δij ) , q∗i }. This is because the numerator describes the surplus of the asset seller, who,
by definition, does not have enough money to purchase the first-best quantity, q∗j (this is precisely why that agent is
there, i.e., to sell assets and boost her liquidity). Thus, for this agent we are always on the “binding branch” of the
bargaining solution, i.e., we have qj
(
m+ δij
)
= ϕ
(
m+ δij
)
. This is typically not true for the asset buyer, hence, in
this case we use the more general expression, qi
(
m˜− δij
)
. A similar argument explains why the the term pj (.) does
not appear in the numerator of the constraint.
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Lemma 2 The result can be divided into two main cases.
Case 1: Consider a meeting between an L-type buyer and a j-type seller, j = {N,H}. Also, define
the cutoff level of asset holdings
a¯Lj (m, m˜) ≡
(1− λ)
[
εju (ϕ(m+ m˜))− εju(ϕm)
]
+ λϕ m˜, if m+ m˜ < m∗j ,
(1− λ)
[
εju(q
∗
j )− εju(ϕm)
]
+ λϕ(m∗j −m), if m+ m˜ ≥ m∗j .
Then, the solution to the bargaining problem is given by
χLj (m, m˜) =
a¯Lj (m, m˜), if A ≥ a¯Lj (m, m˜),A, if A < a¯Lj (m, m˜).
δLj (m, m˜) =
min{m∗j −m, m˜}, if A ≥ a¯Lj (m, m˜),δLj , if A < a¯Lj (m, m˜),
where δLj = δ
L
j (m) solves
(1− λ)εj
[
u
(
ϕ
(
m+ δLj
))− u(ϕm)]+ λϕδLj = A.
Case 2: Consider a meeting between an N -type buyer and an H-type seller. Define the cutoff level
of asset holdings
a¯NH (m, m˜) ≡
(1− λ)εH
[
u
(
ϕ(m+ δ¯)
)− u(ϕm)]+ λεN[u (qN (m˜))− u (qN (m˜− δ¯))] , if m+ m˜ < w∗,
(1− λ) [εHu(q∗H )− εHu(ϕm)]+ λϕ(m∗H −m), if m+ m˜ ≥ w∗.
where w∗ = m∗N +m
∗
H , and δ¯ = δ¯(m, m˜) solves
εHu
′ (ϕ(m+ δ¯)) = εNu′ (qN (m˜− δ¯)) . (15)
Then the solution to the bargaining problem is given by
χNH (m, m˜) =
a¯NH (m, m˜), if A ≥ a¯NH (m, m˜),A, if A < a¯NH (m, m˜).
δNH (m, m˜) =
min{m∗j −m, δ¯}, if A ≥ a¯NH (m, m˜),min{δ1, δ2}, if A < a¯NH (m, m˜),
where δ1 = δ1(m), δ2 = δ2(m, m˜) respectively solve:
(1− λ)εH [u (ϕ (m+ δ1))− u(ϕm)] + λϕδ1 = A,
(1− λ)εH [u (ϕ (m+ δ2))− u(ϕm)] + λεN [u (qN (m˜))− u (qN (m˜− δ2))] = A.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Despite its complex appearance, Lemma 2 admits an intuitive interpretation. Notice that for
all types of meetings the first step in the statement of the lemma is to define an appropriate “cutoff
level” of asset holdings. This is simply the amount of assets that would allow the seller to acquire
the “best possible” transfer of money, i.e., a transfer that would maximize the surplus of the match
(surplus in the OTC is generated by transferring money into the hands of an agent who values it
more in exchange for assets). Clearly, this best possible transfer of money depends on the type of
meeting (i.e., case 1 or 2) and on the money holdings of both parties (which explains why the a¯
terms have two branches depending on the value of m+ m˜).
Consider first case 1 (the buyer is an L-type). Since this agent does not consume in the LW
market, the crucial question is whether the two agents’ money holdings pulled together are enough
to allow the seller reach m∗j after OTC trade and, hence, afford q
∗
j . If this is the case, i.e., if
m+ m˜ ≥ m∗j , the seller will receive a transfer of m∗j −m units of money, i.e., exactly as much as she
lacks in order to get the first-best. If, on the other hand, we have m + m˜ < m∗j , the seller cannot
reach m∗j , and the best she can do is acquire all the buyer’s money, m˜. Naturally, the next question
is “can the seller afford these transfers of liquidity”? The answer depends on whether her asset
holdings, A, exceed the crucial level a¯, which, as we already explained, depends on whether m+ m˜
exceeds m∗j or not. Given this discussion, case 1 becomes transparent: If the seller’s asset holdings
exceed a¯, she will give up exactly that many assets (i.e., χLj = a¯), and she will purchase the amount
of money that maximizes the available surplus (i.e., δLj = min{m∗j −m, m˜}). On the other hand,
if the seller is constrained by her asset holdings, she will give up all of them (i.e., χLj = A) and
acquire an amount of money which solves the Kalai constraint for χLj = A (i.e., δLj = δ
L
j ).
Case 2 admits an almost identical interpretation, with the exception that now the buyer, an
N -type, also wishes to consume in the LW market and, thus, will not be willing to give away all
her money. In this case, if the seller’s asset holdings are plentiful (i.e., A ≥ a¯), she will acquire
either the amount of money that gets her to the first best (i.e., m∗j −m) or the amount of money
that equalizes the marginal utility of LW consumption for the two agents (and, hence, maximizes
the joint surplus). Like before, if asset holdings are scarce (i.e., A < a¯), the seller will give away
all her assets and will acquire the amount of money that solves the Kalai constraint for χLj = A.
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3.3 Objective Function and Optimal Behavior
To effectively describe the agent’s optimal choice, we first construct the “objective function”, a
function that summarizes the net benefit for an agent who carries mˆ units of money and enters next
period’s OTC market as a buyer with probability σ (conditional on being an N-type).12 Due to
11 Whether that amount is given by δ1 or δ2 depends on whether m˜ minus the money transfer is greater or smaller
than m∗i , respectively.
12 As we shall see in what follows these two choices are very closely linked. For instance, other things being equal,
an agent who plans to enter the OTC as a seller, in the event of being an N -type, will typically leave the CM with
less money than an agent who plans to enter as a buyer, because the former will have a chance to boost her liquidity
holdings in the OTC by selling asset for money.
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the quasi-linearity of preferences, this choice will be independent of the agent’s trading history. To
obtain the objective function, substitute (11) (12), (13) into (10), and lead the emerging expression
for E {Ω} by one period. Next, substitute the value functions W and Vi from (8) and (14) into this
expression. Finally, substitute the resulting expression for E {Ω(mˆ)} into (7), and focus only on
the terms that are relevant to the agent’s control variables, (mˆ, σ). After some algebra, one can
verify that the objective function, J , is given by:
J(mˆ, σ) = − (ϕ− βϕˆ) mˆ
+ β
{
µN
[
εNu
(
min{ϕˆmˆ, q∗
N
})−min{ϕˆmˆ, q∗
N
}]+ µ [εHu (ϕˆmˆ)− ϕˆmˆ]}
+ βµpiLH
(
χ˜LH − ϕˆδ˜LH
)
+ βµpiLN
(
χ˜LN − ϕˆδ˜LN
)
+ βµpiHL{εH [u (ϕˆ(mˆ+δLH ))−u (ϕˆmˆ)]−χLH}+βµpiHN{εH [u (ϕˆ(mˆ+δNH ))−u (ϕˆmˆ)]−χNH}
+ βµNpiNHσ
{
χ˜NH − ϕˆδ˜NH + εNu
(
min{ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ), q∗N }
)
−min{ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ), q∗N }
}
− βµNpiNHσ
[
εNu
(
min{ϕˆmˆ, q∗
N
})−min{ϕˆmˆ, q∗
N
}]
+ βµpiNL(1− σ) [εNu (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))− εNu(ϕˆmˆ)− χLN ] . (16)
The interpretation of J is intuitive. The first line represents the net benefit of carrying mˆ units
of money and using it only as a store of value. The second line captures the minimum expected
benefit guaranteed in the LW market if the agent does not trade in the OTC (relevant only if the
agent turns out to be an N or H-type). The third line represents the agent’s benefit if she turns out
to be an L-type and gives away her money (which she does not need) in exchange for assets in the
OTC. Of course, the size of this benefit depends on whether she matches with an N or an H-type
seller (it will be greater in the latter case). The fourth line represents the benefit of an H-type
who boosts her cash holdings beyond mˆ by selling assets in the OTC. The fifth and sixth lines
represent the net benefit of the N -type who enters the OTC market as a buyer, and the last line
stands for the net benefit of the N -type who enters the OTC market as a seller. It is understood
that the various expressions χ, δ are determined in Lemma 2, and for i = {L,N}, j = {N,H}, we
have χij = χij (mˆ, m˜), δij = δij (mˆ, m˜), and χ˜ij = χij (m˜, mˆ), δ˜ij = δij (m˜, mˆ), where m˜ is the agent’s
expectation about the money holdings of the agent that she will encounter in the OTC market.13
It is also understood that the various matching probabilities in the OTC market, i.e., the terms piij
are typically functions of Σ, the agent’s belief about the probability with which other agents enter
the OTC as buyers, conditional on being N -types (see equations (1)-(6) for details).
The next lemma describes the agent’s optimal choice of σ.
13 Recall that Lemma 2 describes the various χ, δ terms as functions of the vector (m, m˜), where m is the buyer’s
money holdings and m˜ is the seller’s money holdings. Also, notice that the terms χ˜, δ˜ in the objective function refer
to the case in which the agent is a seller. This is precisely why in these two expressions the agent’s own money
holdings, mˆ, appear as the second argument.
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Lemma 3 Define two new variables, SS and SB as follows:
SS ≡ εNu (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))− εNu (ϕˆmˆ)− χLN ,
SB ≡ χ˜NH − ϕˆδ˜NH + εNu
(
min{ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ), q∗N }
)
−min{ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ), q∗N }
− [εNu (min{ϕˆmˆ, q∗N })−min{ϕˆmˆ, q∗N }] .
Also, define λB = λB (mˆ, m˜) ≡ SB/SS . Then, the agent’s optimal entry choice satisfies:
a) If piNL/piNH > λB (mˆ, m˜), σ = 0.
b) If piNL/piNH < λB (mˆ, m˜), σ = 1.
c) If piNL/piNH = λB (mˆ, m˜), we have σ ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, piNL/piNH is non-decreasing in Σ, and λB is strictly increasing in mˆ given that ϕˆmˆ < q
∗
N
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Careful inspection of SS , SB reveals that these terms represent the surplus for the N -type agent
from entering the OTC market as a seller or a buyer, respectively, for any given portfolio choice mˆ
and beliefs (m˜,Σ).14 As a seller, the N -type can only meet with L-types, and this will happen with
probability piNL . On the other hand, as a buyer, the N -type can only meet with H-types, and this
will happen with probability piNH . Naturally, the agent will choose to enter the OTC market as a
seller if and only if piNLSS > piNHSB , and will be indifferent if these terms are equal. Two facts are
important to keep in mind. First, the agent will be relatively more likely to match in the OTC as
a seller (and, other things equal, to enter the OTC as a seller) if she expects that many N-types
enter that market as buyers; that is, the ratio piNL/piNH is (weakly) increasing in Σ. Second, the
ratio λB , which captures the relative surplus for the N -type who decides to become an asset buyer,
is increasing in the agent’s own money holdings (for mˆ < m∗
N
).15
We now move on to the characterization of the optimal choice of money holdings, which is tightly
linked to the choice of σ. This task is challenging because, for any given beliefs (m˜,Σ), different
choices of mˆ will bring the agent into one of the many different branches of the OTC bargaining
protocol. To simplify the exposition of the results we impose an additional assumption:16
ASSUMPTION 1: Henceforth, it is assumed that q∗
H
= 2q∗
N
. Since m∗i = q
∗
i /ϕ, for i = {N,H},
we also have m∗
H
= 2m∗. Also, define q∗
N
≡ q∗ and m∗
N
≡ m∗, so that q∗
H
= 2q∗, m∗
H
= 2m∗.
Even with the additional simplifying assumption, and even after assuming that the asset supply,
A, is large enough so that the asset constraint never binds, the domain of the objective function
is still divided into twelve different regions, which makes the analysis very cumbersome. To ease
14 The agent expects all trading partners to hold m˜ units of money, regardless of their types. This is so because
she realizes that other agents (also) had to make the money holding decision before they found out their types.
15 For instance, consider the extreme case where an N -type agent carries mˆ = m∗
N
: This agent’s surplus from
entering the OTC market as a seller is zero, since she already has enough liquidity to purchase her first-best quantity.
16 This assumption simply re-scales the values of the parameters q∗
H
and q∗
N
. It is not essential for solving the
model, but it significantly diminishes the number of cases that one needs to consider, and, as explained below, even
with this assumption we already have twelve different regions.
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the presentation, we relegate all the technical details to Appendix A.2, and we provide an intuitive
description of the results in the main text.
The lower panel of Figure 1, which measures the agent’s expectation about other agents’ money
holdings, m˜, on the vertical axis, and her own money holdings, mˆ, on the horizontal axis illustrates
the twelve relevant regions (for a detailed derivation of the terms mi, i = {2, 3, 4, 5}, see Appendix
A.2). It is important to notice that the agent’s choice of σ is implicit in this figure. More precisely,
there exists a unique level of money holdings, m¯, such that if mˆ < m¯ (mˆ > m¯) the N -type enters
the OTC as a seller (buyer) with certainty.17 This critical level satisfies m¯ = m0, if m˜ < m
∗, and
m¯ = m1, if m˜ ≥ m∗. As is clear from the figure, we have m1 > m0, because an agent who expects
other agents to carry a lot of money is more likely to bring less of her own (and, conditional on
being an N -type, acquire extra cash in the OTC by selling assets).
Each region in the lower panel of Figure 1 corresponds to one of the branches of the OTC
bargaining protocol. Recalling that there are three types of pairs formed in the OTC market, i.e.,
(N,H), (L,N), and (L,H), these regions can be described as follows:
1. In regions 1 and 7, the sum of money holdings of the two parties always allows both of them
to reach the first-best (level of LW consumption), regardless of the type of meeting.
2. In regions 2, 3, and 8, all pairs except for the (N,H) pair attain the first-best, while both
parties within the (N,H) pair do not achieve the first-best.
3. In regions 4, 6, and 9, only the two parties within the (L,N) pair achieve the first-best. All
other parties, in all other types of meetings consume below the first-best.
4. In regions 10 and 12, the liquidity constraint binds for all parties within all types of meetings.
5. Finally, regions 5 and 11 are knife-edge regions. In these regions, the agent’s money holdings
are exactly at the level where her OTC entry choice (as an N -type) is indeterminate. In
region 5, only parties within the (L,N) pair can attain the first-best, while no one can reach
the first-best in region 11.
The agent’s optimal portfolio choice is summarized by her demand function and illustrated in
the top panel of Figure 1, for m˜ > m∗.18 When the cost of carrying money is zero, i.e., ϕ/(βϕˆ) = 1,
the agent sets her money holdings equal to 2m∗: In this extreme case, the agent does not rely
on the services of the OTC market, since she is already carrying enough money to buy the first-
best quantity, even if she turns out to be an H-type. As the holding cost of money goes up, the
agent chooses to carry less and less money from the CM, and seek for extra liquidity in the OTC
market. Given that here m˜ > m∗, as the holding cost of money increases, the agent will find herself,
consecutively, in regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. From optimality, the value that the demand curve
attains at any given mˆ simply reflects the benefit from carrying that marginal unit of money, which,
17 The cutoff point m¯ is defined as the level of money holdings, mˆ, for which piNL/piNH = λB (mˆ, m˜).
18 The vertical axis in this figure measures the (gross) cost of holding money, ϕ/(βϕˆ). It is easy to show that, in
the steady state equilibrium, ϕ/(βϕˆ) = 1 + i, where i is the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 1: Money Demand Function when m˜ > m∗ and m¯ < m3
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in turn, depends crucially on the relevant region. The marginal benefit of money in the various
regions is described in Lemma 7 in Appendix A.2.
As an illustrative example, consider an agent who carries mˆ ∈ (m∗,m5) and finds herself in
region 2. In this region, each unit of money allows the agent to boost her consumption if she is
an H-type who does not match in the OTC because mˆ < 2m∗. On the other hand, there is no
benefit at the margin for an unmatched N -type, since we already have mˆ > m∗. Moreover, an
extra unit of money allows the agent to boost her consumption if she is an H-type who matched
with an N -type, since, by definition, in region 2 the total money holdings within an (N,H) pair
are not enough to allow agents to reach their respective first-best. If the agent turns out to be an
H-type and matches with an L-type, the total money holdings in the match are sufficient for her
to purchase the first-best quantity, 2q∗ (the first-best for the L-type is 0). Does that mean that an
additional unit of money has no benefit for the agent in this event? The answer is no: An extra
unit of money does not help the agent consume more, as she is already getting 2q∗, but it allows her
to purchase 2q∗ using more of her own money, rather than having to rely on the L-type’s money in
the OTC, which is costly (a cost that depends positively on the buyer’s bargaining power). Finally,
given that any mˆ in region 2 satisfies mˆ > m1, conditional on being an N -type, the agent will
choose to enter the OTC as a buyer. Hence, at the margin, the agent’s money generates an extra
benefit since it allows her OTC trading partner (an H-type) to boost her LW consumption.
Generally, a lower mˆ generates a higher marginal benefit, not only because of diminishing
marginal utility, but also because as money becomes more scarce it provides valuable services to
the agent in more “states of the world”.19 The first feature explains why the money demand curve is
decreasing within all segments, and the second one explains why, as mˆ decreases, the demand curve
becomes steeper within any given segment (hence, the various kinks). A striking and important
feature of the demand curve is that it exhibits a jump at mˆ = m1. This follows directly from Lemma
3 and the fact that m1 is the critical point at which the N -type switches her entry decision (recall
that here m˜ > m∗). Hence, an agent who carries m1 +  units of money,  ≈ 0, will enter the OTC
market as a buyer of assets, but an agent who carries m1 −  will enter as a seller. An alternative,
and perhaps more intuitive, interpretation of this finding is that there exists a set [1+γ
l
, 1+γ
h
] 6= ∅,
such that if ϕ/(βϕˆ) ∈ [1 + γ
l
, 1 + γ
h
], the agent is indifferent between entering the OTC market as
a buyer and carrying a large amount of money (point A in the figure) or entering the OTC market
as a seller and carrying a low amount of money (point B in the figure).
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Definition and Properties of Equilibrium
We restrict attention to symmetric, steady state equilibria, where all agents choose the same
portfolios, and the real variables of the model remain constant over time. Since, in steady state, the
19 Where examples of such “states of the world” include “being an unmatched H-type” or “being an L-type who
meets an N-type”, and so on.
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real money balances, Z, do not change over time, we have ϕM = ϕˆMˆ , implying that ϕ/ϕˆ = 1 + γ.
We start with the description of the equilibrium entry choice of N -types, for any given level of real
balances, Z. For this discussion, recall the definition of the term λB from the previous section (the
ratio of the relative surplus for the N -type who enters the OTC as a buyer), and define λB (Z) as
the symmetric equilibrium version of λB, i.e., λB (Z) = λB(mˆ, m˜), evaluated at mˆ = m˜ = Z/ϕˆ.
Lemma 4 Recall from the analysis in Section 2.1 that d ≡ (1− ν)µ/µN < 1. The equilibrium
value of the probability with which N -types enter the OTC market as buyers, Σ¯, is as follows:
(a) If λB (Z) < d, then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with Σ¯ = 0.
(b) If λB (Z) > 1/d, then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with Σ¯ = 1.
(c) If λB (Z) ∈ (d, 1/d), then there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with Σ¯ ∈ (0, 1), and
∂Σ¯/∂λB (Z) > 0.
Lastly, ∂λB (Z)/∂Z > 0, ∀λB (Z) ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 2: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Σ when λB (Z) ∈ (d, 1/d)
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Lemma 4 is straightforward. As we know from Lemma 3, the agent is more likely to enter the
OTC market as a buyer when λB is large, and the ratio piNL/piNH is small, which is true when Σ
is small. Hence, other things equal, having Σ = 0 maximizes the willingness of the typical N -type
to enter as a buyer. But Σ = 0 implies piNL/piNH = d, i.e., d is the minimum value piNL/piNH could
obtain. Thus, part (a) describes a situation where λB is so small that no value of Σ is low enough to
induce an N -type to become a buyer. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium where all N -types
enter the OTC market as sellers. Part (b) admits a similar interpretation: Even if Σ = 1, which
implies that piNL/piNH = 1/d, all the N -types find it optimal to enter the OTC market as buyers.
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The most interesting case is described in part (c). Here, λB ∈ (d, 1/d), hence, there exists a unique
Σ¯ ∈ (0, 1), such that the agent chooses to enter the OTC market as a buyer if and only if Σ < Σ¯.
In this case, a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, Σ¯, exists, as illustrated in Figure 2. Naturally,
Σ¯ is increasing in λB, which, in turn, is increasing in Z (intuitively, when Z is large, N -types are
more likely to buy assets in the OTC and give away their plentiful real balances).
Before defining an equilibrium, it is important to notice that symmetry rules out regions 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, and 8 in the lower panel of Figure 1, since all agents are ex ante identical. On aggregate, only
six regions remain, and, due to symmetry, equilibrium lies along the 45 degree line of that figure.
This is illustrated in the new Figure 3, which measures equilibrium real balances (as opposed to
individual money holdings) on the two axes. We now provide a formal definition of equilibrium.20
Definition 1 A steady state equilibrium consists of a list of bargaining solutions for the LW and
OTC markets,
{(
pi, qi
)
,
(
χij , δij
)}
, described in Lemmas 1 and 2, together with a choice of money
holdings, mˆ, an entry choice in the OTC market for the N -type, Σ, and prices, {ϕ, ϕˆ}, such that:
• mˆ solves the individual optimization problem (7), taking prices as given.
• Σ satsifies the Nash equilibrium described in Lemma 4.
• CM clears and expectations are rational: mˆ = m˜ = (1 + γ)M .
• Real money balances remain constant over time: ϕ/ϕˆ = 1 + γ.
Figure 3: Aggregate Regions of Equilibrium in terms of Real Balances
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20 From now on, we re-define Σ ≡ Σ¯, and use the former as the symbol that captures the equilibrium fraction
of N -types who become asset buyers. Earlier, Σ referred to the typical agent’s belief about other N -types’ entry
decision. However, in what follows we never use that object anymore, so there is no room for confusion.
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Before we move on to the characterization of the equilibrium variables of interest, we describe
some important properties of equilibrium.
Lemma 5 For any λ ∈ (0, 1) a unique steady state equilibrium, {Z,Σ, (pi, qi), (χij , δij)}, exists.
Moreover, there exist {Z¯l, Z¯h}, with 0 < Z¯l < Z¯h < q∗, such that Z ≤ Z¯l implies Σ = 0, Z ≥ Z¯h
implies Σ = 1, and Z ∈ (Z¯l, Z¯h) implies Σ ∈ (0, 1). Both Z¯l and Z¯h are increasing in λ and
limλ→1 Z¯h = q∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 4: Z, Σ, and γ in the Steady State Equilibrium
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The results described in Lemma 5 are depicted in Figure 4. First, recall from Lemma 4 that
λB (Z) is increasing in Z, for all Z < q
∗. The terms Z¯l, Z¯h satisfy λB (Z¯l) = d and λB (Z¯h) = 1/d,
which explains why Z¯l < Z¯h. Now, consider a situation where the typical agent carries Z ≈ 0.
Agents who turn out to be N -types have a strong disincentive to become buyers: The tiny amount
of (real) money they carry, can give them a huge marginal benefit from consumption in the LW
market (due to the Inada condition), so they will not want to waste it buying assets. On the
contrary, they want to enter as sellers hoping to match with L-types who would give away their
money. Technically, we have limZ→0 λB (Z) = 0. Hence, for any Z ≤ Z¯l, we have λB (Z) ≤ d, which
(through Lemma 4) implies that all N -types enter the OTC market as sellers.
Next, suppose that the typical seller carries Z ≈ q∗. Agents who turn out to be N -types have
no benefit from selling assets (and boosting their liquidity holdings), since they can basically afford
the first-best quantity. On the other hand, the benefit from entering as a buyer of assets/provider
of liquidity is positive, since H-types (who carry the same Z) can really use some extra cash. In
short, we have limZ→q∗ λB (Z) = ∞. Hence, for any Z ≥ Z¯h, we have λB (Z) ≥ 1/d, which (again,
through Lemma 4) implies that all N -types will want to enter the OTC market as buyers. For
intermediate values of real balances, i.e., Z ∈ (Z¯l, Z¯h), we have λB (Z) ∈ (d, 1/d). In this case, a
unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists, where N -types enter the OTC market as buyers with
probability Σ ∈ (0, 1). Naturally, the equilibrium Σ is increasing in Z.
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A few observations are in order. First, it is worth emphasizing that the mixed strategy equi-
librium “smooths out” the agents’ behavior, in the follwing sense. As Figure 1 highlights, each
agent’s money demand exhibits a multiplicity, which stems from the fact that, as an N -type, the
agent can either become an asset seller (thus, carrying less money) or an asset buyer (thus, carrying
more money). But since in equilibrium each of the (infinitely many) agents mixes, by a law of large
numbers, the aggregate money demand is unique, for any given γ. Second, an exogenous increase
in λ will shift both Z¯l and Z¯h to the right, and it will have a non-negative effect on the aggregate
measure of N -type who enter the OTC market as sellers (strictly positive if Z exceeds the value
that Z¯l attained before the change in λ). Third, since Σ is increasing in Z and Z is decreasing in
γ, it is quite clear that a higher inflation rate will generate a higher fraction of sellers in the OTC
market. This feature will be key for the discussion of the effects of monetary policy on welfare.
4.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
4.2.1 The effect of inflation on welfare
Following Rocheteau and Wright (2005), we define the social welfare function, W, as the sum
of all agents’ steady state net utilities. As we show in Appendix A.3, we have
W = µ[εHu(Z)− Z] + µN [εNu (min{Z, q∗})−min{Z, q∗}]
+ µLHSLH (Z) + µNHSNH (Z) + µLNSLN (Z), (17)
where µij denotes the measure of OTC matches between buyers of type i = {L,N} and sellers of
type j = {N,H}, and Sij denotes the total surplus generated in these matches. As is standard in
models that build on the Lagos-Wright framework, the welfare function depends only on net LW
utilities. But here we have some extra surplus generated through the OTC market by allocating
liquidity into the hands of those who value it more. It proves useful to decompose the total welfare
into two parts: The net LW utility that would be generated without OTC trading (represented by
the first line in (17)), and the sum of OTC surpluses generated when the three different types of
matches occur (represented by the second line in (17)). Also, it is straightforward to show that
µLH = µν, µNH = µν(1− ν) min {Σ/d, 1} , µLN = µν(1− ν) min {(1− Σ)/d, 1} ,
so that the various µij terms typically depend on Σ, which depends on Z, which, in turn, depends
on γ. This highlights a novelty of our model: Here, changes in inflation will not only affect welfare
through the traditional channel, i.e., by affecting equilibrium real balances and, thus, the amount
of LW good that agents can afford, but also by changing the composition of agents who demand
and supply assets in the OTC market.
Before we analyze the effects of monetary policy on W, it is useful to establish a benchmark
of efficient entry in the OTC market. To that end, we ask: For any given parameter values, and
for any given Z, what is the value of Σ that maximizes welfare? Letting Σ
∗
denote that value, the
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question that arises naturally is whether the equilibrium Σ coincides with Σ
∗
. And, if not, whether
policy can improve welfare by shifting Σ closer to Σ
∗
. The first task is to describe the optimal Σ
∗
.
Lemma 6 The value of Σ
∗
that maximizes welfare, for any given Z, is as follows:
(a) If Z ≥ q∗, then Σ∗ ∈ [d, 1].
(b) If Z < q∗ and d ≥ 1/2, then Σ∗ = d.
(c) If Z < q∗ and d < 1/2, then Σ∗ ∈ [d, 1− d].
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 5: Determination of the optimal Σ for Z < q∗
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Since the total measure of (L,H) meetings is given by µν, different values of Σ only affect the
measure of (N,H) and (L,N) meetings. If Z ≥ q∗, then an (L,N) meeting generates no surplus,
and the objective should be to maximize µNH , which is satisfied for any Σ ∈ [d, 1]. If Z < q∗,
there is a non-trivial trade-off between forming (N,H) or (L,N) matches. The optimal Σ
∗
for this
case is depicted in Figure 5. Consider first the case where d ≥ 1/2, so that N -types are relatively
scarce (left panel of the figure and part (b) of the lemma). For any Σ < 1 − d, an increase in Σ
unquestionably improves welfare, since it increases µNH without lowering µLN (because there are
already enough N -type sellers in the OTC market). For Σ ∈ [1− d, d] an increase in Σ raises µNH
and lowers µLN . However, as we show in the appendix, the OTC surplus in the (N,H) matches is
higher than the one in (L,N) matches.21 As a result, ∂W/∂Σ is increasing for this range of Σ too.
If Σ > d, there are too many N -type buyers in the market, so that a further increase in Σ would
only decrease µLN without having any effect on µNH . To summarize, if Z < q
∗ and d ≥ 1/2, the
unique optimal Σ is given by Σ
∗
= d. The right panel of Figure 5 depicts the case in which N -types
are relatively abundant, i.e., d < 1/2 (part (c) of the lemma). The interpretation for this case is
21 Intuitively, this is because Z < q∗, which, together with the fact that u′′ < 0, implies that a monetary transfer
from an N -type to an H-type generates a greater surplus than a monetary transfer from an L-type to an N -type.
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similar, with the exception that, in the intermediate region Σ ∈ [d, 1−d], any change in Σ will have
no effect on either µNH or µLN . Hence, in this case any Σ ∈ [d, 1− d] is welfare maximizing.
We can now examine whether the actual equilibrium entry decision satisfies Σ = Σ
∗
. From
Lemma 5 we know that, for any Z ≥ q∗, Σ = 1, which is welfare maximizing (as is any other
Σ ∈ [d, 1], by part (a) of Lemma 6). However, for Z < q∗, the equilibrium Σ generally does not
coincide with Σ
∗
. When λ is too high too many N -types enter the OTC market as sellers, i.e.,
Σ < Σ
∗
. In this case, decreasing γ improves welfare not only because each agent carries more
real balances, but also because the lower inflation tends to increase the equilibrium value of Σ,
thus bringing it closer to the optimal value Σ
∗
. But establishing a negative relationship between
inflation and welfare is a result consistent with the vast majority of monetary models. What is more
interesting is to examine whether the new channel introduced in our model can lead to situations
where an increase in inflation can improve equilibrium welfare. We now show that the answer to
this question is affirmative. We start by specifying a necessary condition for this result.
Corollary 1 A necessary condition for inflation to improve welfare is that Z ∈ I ≡ [Z∗ , Z¯h], where
Z¯h has been already defined, and Z
∗
solves
Σ(Z
∗
) = D ≡
d, if d ≥ 1/2,1− d, if d < 1/2.
Corollary 1 can be thought of as our version of the Hosios condition (Hosios (1990)). The term
D simply captures the welfare maximizing value of Σ, given that Z < q∗.22 However, in our model
the entry decision, summarized by Σ, does not depend only on the value of λ (which is implicit
in Lemma 5), but also on the equilibrium value of Z. And, since D ∈ (0, 1), there will always
exist Z
∗ ∈ (Z¯l, Z¯h), as in Figure 6, such that Σ(Z∗) = D. In words, Z∗ captures the level of real
balances that is associated with the agent making the socially optimal entry decision. Then, it
follows immediately that there exists a non-empty set I ≡ [Z∗ , Z¯h], such that, for any Z ∈ I, an
increase in γ will reduce the equilibrium value of Σ, thus shifting it closer to the socially efficient
level. Of course, having Z ∈ I is only necessary for ∂W/∂γ > 0, because any increase in γ will
also have the traditional negative effect on welfare, through reducing equilibrium real balances.
Establishing a sufficient condition for ∂W/∂γ > 0 is the subject of the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Define γ3 ≡ {γ : Z = Z¯h}, γ4 ≡ {γ : Z = Z
∗}, and G(Z) ≡ µ [εHu′(Z )− 1] +
µN [εNu
′(Z )− 1]. Also, define F¯ (Z) as follows: If Z > q∗/2, then
F¯ (Z) ≡ µN νdεN (1− λ)2/λ
[
u′(Z − ηNH (Z))− u′(Z)
]
+ νµ
[
εHu
′(Z)− 2]+ νµ+ µN νdλεH [u′(Z)− u′(Z + ηNH (Z))] ,
22 When d < 1/2, this value is not unique. In that case we define D as the maximum value of Σ that maximizes
welfare, i.e., D = 1− d.
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Figure 6: A Necessary Condition for Welfare Improving Inflation
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and if Z ≤ q∗/2, then
F¯ (Z) ≡ µN νdεN (1− λ)2/λ
[
u′(Z − ηNH (Z))− u′(Z)
]
+ νµ
[
εHu
′(Z)− εH2u′(Z)
]
+ νµ
− νµN
[
2− εNu′(Z)
]
+ µN νdλεH
[
u′(Z)− u′(Z + ηNH (Z))
]
,
where ηNH (Z) denotes the real balances that get transferred in an (N,H) OTC meeting, when
equilibrium real balances are Z.
If G(Z
∗
) < F¯ (Z¯h), then ∂W/∂γ > 0 for all γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 states that, under certain parameter values, equilibrium welfare is increasing in
inflation, as long as γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4), which implies that Z is in the set I identified in Corollary 1. This
result is illustrated in Figure 7.23 For any γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4) an increase in γ has a positive effect on
welfare by improving efficiency of matching in the OTC market or, alternatively, by “correcting”
the OTC entry decision of the typical agent and shifting it closer to the socially optimal. However,
an increase in γ, equivalent to an increase in the holding cost of currency, will also have a negative
effect on welfare, through the reduction of equilibrium Z. The sign of ∂W/∂γ will be positive as
long as the benefit outweighs the cost. This is the meaning of the condition G(Z
∗
) < F¯ (Z¯h). More
precisely, the term G(Z), which is equal to the derivative of the first line on the right-hand side
of (17) with respect to Z, captures the marginal benefit generated in the LW market when agents
carry Z units of real balances. This benefit is decreasing in Z due to the strict concavity of u. On
the other hand, F¯ (Z), which is equal to the negative of the derivative of the second line in (17)
with respect to Z, captures the marginal change in OTC efficiency when agents carry Z units of
23 Proposition 1 focuses on the range of γ’s for which we may have ∂W/∂γ > 0, i.e., (γ3 , γ4). The remaining values
of γ that are marked in the figure (γ1 , γ2 , γ5) are simply the critical points where equilibrium switches to a different
region. We provide precise definitions for these objects in Section 4.2.2, where they become critical for the analysis.
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real balances. In the appendix, we show that this expression is also decreasing in Z. Since both F¯
and G are decreasing in Z, the condition G(Z
∗
) < F¯ (Z¯h) guarantees that even the lowest possible
value of F¯ (Z) is higher than the highest possible value of G(Z), for Z ∈ I. Therefore, we must
have F¯ (Z) > G(Z), for all Z ∈ I, which, by definition, implies that ∂W/∂Z < 0, for all Z ∈ I, and
is equivalent to ∂W/∂γ > 0 for all γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4).
The condition G(Z
∗
) < F¯ (Z¯h) guarantees that ∂W/∂γ > 0 for all γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4), but ∂W/∂γ > 0
will be true within a subset of (γ3 , γ4) under much weaker conditions. As long as G(Z
∗
) < F¯ (Z
∗
),
there exists γ¯ ∈ (γ3 , γ4), such that ∂W/∂γ > 0 holds for all γ ∈ (γ3 , γ¯). Finally, it is relatively
straightforward to show that F¯ is decreasing in λ, which is a quite intuitive result. Other things
equal, a low value of λ leads to an inefficiently low entry of sellers in the OTC market (i.e., a high
equilibrium Σ). It is precisely under these conditions that a higher inflation rate can generate a
large benefit by increasing the matching efficiency in the OTC market. While W can be increasing
in γ within a certain subset of the domain, it is maximized when γ → β − 1, i.e., at the Friedman
rule. This is not too surprising, since at the Friedman rule the cost of holding cash is zero, and all
agents carry the highest amount of real balances they may possibly need, Z = 2q∗. Clearly, in this
case there is no trade in the OTC market since no one needs to sell assets for extra cash.
Figure 7: Equilibrium welfare as a function of γ
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4.2.2 OTC Prices
In this section, we describe equilibrium asset prices in the OTC market and study how these
prices are affected by the inflation rate. Proposition 2 states the main results. For this discussion
recall the definition of γ3 from the previous section, and further define γ1 ≡ {γ : Z = 3q∗/2},
γ2 ≡ {γ : Z = q∗}, and γ5 ≡ {γ : Z = Z¯l}. Intuitively, γ1 stands for the critical value of γ such that
both agents in an (N,H) match (i.e., the most liquidity demanding one) can get the first-best LW
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consumption if and only if γ ≤ γ1 . The term γ2 represents a similar critical point, but for the (less
liquidity demanding) match (L,H). Finally, the set (γ3 , γ5) marks the region (Z¯l, Z¯h) (in terms of
real balances) within which Σ ∈ (0, 1) (Lemma 5).
Proposition 2 Let ψij denote the real price per unit of asset sold in an OTC meeting between a
buyer of type i = {L,N} and a seller of type j ∈ {N,H)}, i.e., ψij ≡ ϕ(δij/χij).
(a) All prices satisfy ψij < 1, for all γ < β − 1.
(b) ψij is strictly decreasing in γ, for all γ, in the (L,N) and (L,H) matches.
(c) ψNH is strictly decreasing in γ, for all γ ≤ γ1. For γ > γ1, ψNH is strictly decreasing in γ if
u′′′ > 0; otherwise the sign is ambiguous.
(d) ψLN > ψLH , for all γ, and ψNH = ψLH , for γ ≤ γ1.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 8: OTC equilibrium asset prices
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The results stated in Proposition 2 are illustrated in Figure 8, which plots the three match-
specific OTC prices as functions of the inflation rate. First, notice that all three types of prices
coexist only for γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5), because only within this range we have N -types entering on both sides
of the market. If γ ≤ γ3 (γ ≥ γ5), all N -types enter the OTC market as buyers (sellers) and trade
between N and L (H) types vanishes. Part (a) of the proposition states that all prices will be lower
than 1, which is the value that the asset would deliver, if held to maturity (i.e., if held until the
forthcoming CM). This is true because sellers of assets are in need of liquidity, and they will be
willing to sell their asset at a “haircut” which is decreasing in their bargaining power, λ.
To understand the effect of inflation on asset prices, one should first notice that, in principle, an
increase in γ generates two opposing effects. On the one hand, a higher inflation lowers equilibrium
Z and makes agents with a consumption opportunity more desperate for liquidity. To acquire this
extra liquidity, agents are willing to sell their assets at cheaper prices. Hence, a higher γ generates
a downward pressure on assets prices. On the other hand, a higher inflation reduces the value of
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real balances that the agents already brought with them, and makes agents who are buying assets
more willing to get rid of their cash, as in a “hot potato” effect. This generates a positive effect on
prices, as buyers of assets are willing to give away more money for a given amount of assets.24
Part (b) of the proposition states that in matches where the asset buyer/provider of liquidity is
an L-type the first of the two aforementioned forces prevails, so that the equilibrium price is always
decreasing in inflation. Part (c) of the proposition highlights that this result is not necessarily true
when the asset buyer is an N -type and γ > γ1 . The reason for this discrepancy is quite intuitive.
The second force (the one putting upward pressure on prices) is more likely to prevail when the
providers of liquidity value the money (which they are about to give up) a lot. Clearly, from all the
possible asset buyers, the ones who value money the most are N -types who can use that money
to boost their LW consumption, and, by definition, N -types find themselves in this situation when
γ > γ1 . Put differently, for the second force to prevail (thus, leading to ∂ψ/∂γ > 0), an increase in
inflation must take away a large fraction of the buyer’s value for the money she is about to give.
But for this to happen, the agent must have a high valuation for that money to begin with, and
this is not the case for L-types (ever) or for N -types when γ ≤ γ1 : These agents are happy to hand
over to the H-type all the money she needs to reach 2q∗ with or without high inflation. It turns
out that ∂ψNH/∂γ can be negative even for γ ≥ γ1 , but this requires additional assumptions. For
instance, in the appendix we show that this will definitely be the case if the third derivative of u is
positive, as is the case for a standard CRRA utility function.
As pointed out by Lagos and Zhang (2015), the negative relationship between asset prices
and the nominal interest rate (i.e., the holding cost of money) reported in parts (b) and (under
some extra conditions) (c) of Proposition 2 is well documented in the data and often considered
anomalous. Although both papers offer a theory that can rationalize this regularity, it should be
noted that the channels that give rise to this result in the two frameworks are very different. In
Lagos and Zhang (2015), agents have an (ex post) different valuation for the asset per se, and
money is useful so that agents with a high valuation can purchase the asset from those with a
low valuation in the OTC market. Hence, in their model, the negative relationship between asset
prices and the nominal interest rate stems from the fact that money and assets are complements.
In our model, all agents have an identical valuation for the asset, and they use it in order to acquire
additional liquidity in the OTC market. In that sense, the asset is effectively a substitute to money.
Nevertheless, an increase in the holding cost of money reduces equilibrium Z, thus making agents
more desperate for extra liquidity and, hence, more willing to sell assets at a lower price.25
24 These two forces are also identified in Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2012). However, the present paper has
some important differences. First, here we have an additional type of agents (the N -types) who choose which side
of the market they wish to join, thus, crucially affecting all equilibrium variables, including asset prices. Second,
in Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2012) the only buyers of assets are agents who do not have a consumption
opportunity (like the L-types here), while here N -types, who get to consume in the LW market, can also be asset
buyers. As we shall see in what follows, this distinction plays an important role for the buyer’s valuation of money,
which, in turn, is crucial for understanding how inflation affects asset prices.
25 The fact that the two models deliver such a similar result although they model assets and money so differently,
might be striking at first. But one should keep in mind that Lagos and Zhang (2015) study the effect of changes in
the holding cost of money on the CM asset price, while we focus on the OTC asset price (we have excluded asset
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The last part of Proposition 2 states that ψLN > ψLH , for all γ. Intuitively, since H-type sellers
have more to gain by acquiring an additional dollar from the L-type than N -type sellers, they will
always offer a better deal to the L-type buyer (which is precisely why L-types search harder for
H-type partners). Finally, for γ ≤ γ1 , we have ψNH = ψLH , which is also intuitive. By definition,
γ ≤ γ1 implies that, even in the (N,H) match, there is enough liquidity for both types to get the
first-best. Hence, it does not matter whether the provider of liquidity is an L or an N -type, since
for both types the “marginal unit” of money is good only as a store of value and not as a facilitator
of trade in the forthcoming LW market (this benefit is already fully consummated).
4.2.3 OTC Volume
We now turn to the study of OTC trade volume and how it depends on the inflation rate. For
this discussion define γ˜ ≡ {γ : Z = q∗/2} and recall from Proposition 1 that ηij stands for the real
balances exchanged in a typical (i, j) meeting. In the following proposition when we say that the
volume of trade is “increasing” (or “decreasing”) it is understood that it is “increasing in γ”.
Proposition 3 Let Vij denote the volume of real balances traded in all OTC meetings between
buyers of type i = {L,N} and sellers of type j ∈ {N,H)}, i.e., Vij ≡ µijηij . Also, let V denote the
total OTC trade volume, i.e., V ≡ VLN + VLH + VNH .
Trade Volume for Each Pair
(a) VLH is strictly increasing for γ < γ2 and strictly decreasing for γ > γ2.
(b) VNH is strictly increasing for γ < γ1 and strictly decreasing for γ ∈ (γ1 , γ3). For γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5),
VNH is strictly decreasing if u
′′′ > 0, and can be hump-shaped if u′′′ < 0. In either case,
VNH → 0, as γ → γ5, and VNH = 0, for all γ ≥ γ5.
(c) VLN = 0 for all γ ≤ γ3. If γ˜ > γ3, VLN is strictly increasing for γ ∈ (γ3 , γ˜), while the sign
of ∂VLN /∂γ is ambiguous for γ ∈ (γ˜, γ4). If γ˜ < γ3, the sign of ∂VLN /∂γ is ambiguous for
γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4). For γ > γ4, VLN is strictly decreasing.
Total Trade Volume
The total trade volume, V , is strictly increasing for γ < γ2 and strictly decreasing for γ ∈ (γ2 , γ3)∪
(γ5 ,∞). For γ ∈ (γ3 , γ4), the sign of ∂V/∂γ is ambiguous, but likely to be positive if µN is relatively
large. For γ ∈ (γ4 , γ5), V is strictly decreasing if u′′′ > 0, and can be hump-shaped if u′′′ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3 delivers an extremely rich set of results regarding the effect of inflation on OTC
trade volume. The OTC trade volume for each pair consists of two parts, the extensive margin, i.e.,
µij , and the intensive margin, i.e., ηij . The effect of inflation on the intensive margin is generally
simple: When real money balances are enough for the agents in the match to get the first-best, a
higher inflation induces the seller to require more real balances, because she now has to rely more
trade in the CM for tractability). What is more important here is not the labeling of markets, but the timing of
events: in Lagos and Zhang (2015) agents trade assets in the CM before they find out their valuation for the asset.
Here, agents trade assets in the OTC after they have found out their valuation for the LW good.
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Figure 9: Trade Volume in the OTC Market
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heavily on the other agent’s money. As a result, trade volume is increasing for relatively low values
of γ. On the other hand, when the pair cannot get the first-best an increase in γ reduces Z, and
although the seller would like to acquire more (real) money from the buyer, the buyer can simply
not provide this liquidity because she did not carry enough. As a result, trade volume is decreasing
for relatively high values of γ. The effect of inflation on the extensive margin works through changes
in the equilibrium Σ. As we have already established, we have Σ = 1 for all γ ≤ γ3 , Σ ∈ (0, 1) and
∂Σ/∂γ < 0 for all γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5), and Σ = 0 for all γ ≥ γ5 .
Given this dicsussion, the interpretation of Proposition 3 becomes straightforward. First, the
fact that Σ = 0, for all γ ≥ γ5 , immediately explains why VNH = 0 in this range. Similarly, the fact
that VLN = 0, for γ ≤ γ3 , can be rationalized by the fact that, in this range of γ’s, we have Σ = 1.
Another immediate result is that for values of γ that are too low or too high, only the effect of
inflation on the intensive margin is relevant.26 This, in turn, explains why the trade volume within
each specific pair is typically hump-shaped, i.e., increasing for low γ but eventually decreasing for
high γ (right panel of Figure 9). For γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5), the effect of γ on the extensive margin becomes
relevant, and it may be of the opposite sign than the one on the intensive margin, so that the
sign of ∂Vij/∂γ depends on the relative magnitude of the two forces. As an example, consider
VNH = µNHηNH . An increase in γ reduces ηNH for all γ ≥ γ1 , since in this region the (N,H) pair
is liquidity constrained. For γ ≤ γ3 , this effect (on the intensive margin) is the only relevant one,
hence, ∂VNH/∂γ < 0 with no doubt. But for γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5), an increase in γ raises µNH . In this case,
the sign of ∂VNH/∂γ is ambiguous and will depend on parameter values, especially the sign of u
′′′
(Figure 9 illustrates the case where ∂VNH/∂γ < 0 in that region).
The left panel of Figure 9 depicts the total OTC trade volume, V . Since V = VLN +VLH +VNH ,
the total trade volume inherits the properties of the individual Vij terms. For instance, for any
26 The effect of changes in γ on the extensive margin, captured by ∂Σ/∂γ, is equal to zero for all γ, with the
exception of the intermediate region γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5).
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γ ∈ (γ2 , γ3) ∪ (γ5 ,∞), V is strictly decreasing, since within this range all individual counterparts
of V (that are not equal to zero) are strictly decreasing. It is also relatively easy to show that V is
strictly increasing for all γ < γ2 , even though VNH is decreasing for γ ∈ (γ1 , γ2) (because the large
increase of VLH within that region prevails). However, for intermediate values of γ, i.e., γ ∈ (γ3 , γ5),
the sign of ∂V/∂γ is ambiguous, mainly due to the effect of γ on the extensive margin, and this
can grant V non-standard or “exotic” shapes. For example, Figure 9 illustrates the case where V
exhibits a double hump.27
5 Conclusions
We develop a monetary model that incorporates trade of assets in an OTC financial market,
characterized by search and bargaining. The OTC market offers an important social service, since
it allows liquidity to be allocated into the hands of the agents who have a higher valuation for
it. A unique feature of our model is that inflation affects welfare not only through the traditional
channel, i.e., through determining equilibrium real balances, but also through influencing agents’
entry decisions in the OTC market. Our model delivers a number of interesting results regarding
the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices, and OTC trade volume. We find that inflation
can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that
agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Consistent with
a documented empirical regularity, we show that a higher inflation rate typically decreases asset
prices, because it depresses equilibrium real balances and makes agents more willing to sell assets
(for extra liquidity) at lower prices. Finally, our model predicts that the effect of inflation on asset
trade volume, not only is not monotone, but can actually exhibit exotic patterns; for instance, the
trade volume could have a double hump-shape when plotted against the rate of inflation.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Matching Technology
A standard Mortensen-Pissarides matching function.
Here, we show why a standard Mortensen-Pissarides matching function delivers some undesir-
able results in our framework. Assume that a CRS function, m(µB , µS ), which is increasing in both
arguments, brings together buyers and sellers in an unbiased way, i.e., in a way such that agents’
matching rates are not affected by their types. If an N -type enters as a seller, her probability of
meeting an L-type buyer is given by
p˜iNL =
m(µB , µS )
µS
µ
µB
,
where the first fraction represents the probability with which an N -type seller matches with any
buyer, and the second fraction represents the relative measure of L-types in the population of
buyers. Using the fact that m is CRS, we can write
p˜iNL = m
(
1
µB
,
1
µS
)
µ.
Arguing in a similar fashion, the probability with which an N -type agent, who entered the OTC
market as a buyer, meets an H-type seller is given by
p˜iNH =
m(µB , µS )
µB
µ
µS
= m
(
1
µB
,
1
µS
)
µ = p˜iNL .
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The representative N -type will enter the OTC market as a seller if and only if p˜iNLSS ≥ p˜iNH SB ,
where SS ≡ SS (εN , εH , λ,m, m˜) and SB ≡ SB (εN , εH , λ,m, m˜) represent the OTC market surplus
for an N -type who enters as a seller or a buyer, respectively.28 As it is shown in Lemma 3, these
terms depend on {εN , εH , λ,m, m˜}, where m is the agent’s own money holdings and m˜ is her belief
about the money holdings of potential trading partners. Since p˜iNL = p˜iNH , the last inequality
reduces to SS ≥ SB . Hence, depending on the values of the parameters {εN , εH , λ} and the beliefs,
m˜, either all N -types enter the OTC market as buyers or they will all enter as sellers.29 This
means that the representative N -type’s entry decision is not affected by Σ, i.e., with the standard
Mortensen-Pissarides matching function there are no congestion effects, a feature which we consider
undesirable and unrealistic for most search markets.
Derivation of equations (1)-(6).
Here, we show in detail the derivation of equation (2). The derivation of (4), (5), and (6) follows
identical steps. As we pointed out in the main text, an H-type can only meet an N -type seller
in the second stage. The probability with which an H-type does not match in the first stage and,
hence, proceeds to the second stage is (1− ν). To find piHN this probability must be multiplied by
the probability with which she matches with an N -type in the second stage. Since the measure of
N -types who became buyers of assets is ΣµN ), we have
piHN = (1− ν)
νmin {ΣµN , (1− ν)µ}
(1− ν)µ = ν(1− ν) min
{
ΣµN
(1− ν)µ, 1
}
= ν(1− ν) min
{
1,
Σ
d
}
,
which coincides with the expression reported in (2).
A.2 Optimal Behavior of the Agents
This section provides a formal description of the agent’s optimal choice of mˆ, which was de-
scribed intuitively in the main text. As we have already explained, for any given beliefs, (m˜,Σ), the
agent’s own choice (mˆ, σ) will bring her into a different branch of the OTC bargaining protocol, and
these branches are represented by the 12 different regions in the lower panel of Figure 1. The terms
m0,m1 that appear in the figure have been already explained in the main text. The remaining terms
are defined as follows: m2 = max{m∗− m˜, 0}, m3 = 2m∗−max{m˜,m∗}, m4 = 2m∗−min{m˜,m∗},
and m5 = 2m
∗ −max{m˜−m∗, 0}.
The agent’s money demand is explained in detail in the next lemma.
Lemma 7 Taking prices (ϕ, ϕˆ), and beliefs, (m˜,Σ), as given, the optimal choice of the represen-
tative agent, mˆ, satisfies:
If m5 ≤ mˆ ≤ 2m∗ (region 1) then,
28 To arrive at this argument, we use the fact that in any meeting between an N -type buyer and an N -type seller
no surplus is generated, hence, the N -type has no gain from such meetings.
29 This reasoning implicitly takes into account of the fact that money holdings become degenerate after CM in
equilibrium due to the quasi-linearity.
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ϕβϕˆ
= 1 + µ [1− λ(piHL + piHN )]
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1] , (a.1)
If m4 ≤ mˆ ≤m5 (region 2) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ [1− λpiHL ]
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µpiHNλ [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))]
+ µNpiNH (1− λ)
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− 1
]
, (a.2)
If m∗ ≤ mˆ ≤m4 (region 8) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µλpiHN [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))]
− µλpiHL
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))
]
+ µ(1− λ)
{
piNH
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− 1
]
+ piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]} , (a.3)
If m3 ≤ mˆ ≤m∗ and m¯ < m3 (region 3) or If m¯ < mˆ ≤m∗ and m¯ > m3 then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ [1− λpiHL ]
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ µN (1− λ)piNH
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)
]
− µpiHNλ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
, (a.4)
If m3 ≤ mˆ < m¯ then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ [1− λpiHL ]
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− µNλpiNL
[
εNu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µpiHNλ [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))] , (a.5)
If m3 ≤ mˆ = m¯ then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ [1− λpiHL ]
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [1− λ(1− σ)piNL ] [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ µNσ(1− λ)piNH
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)
]
− µpiHNλ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
, ∀σ ∈ [0, 1], (a.6)
If m2 ≤ mˆ ≤m3 and m¯ < m2 (region 9) or If m¯ < mˆ ≤m3 and m¯ > m2 (region 4),
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µλpiHL [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))]
− µλpiHN
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
+ µ(1− λ)piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))− 1]
+ µN (1− λ)piNH
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− εNu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ))
]
, (a.7)
If m2 ≤ mˆ < m¯ (region 6) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− µλpiHL
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))
]− µλpiHN [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))]
+ µ(1− λ)piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))− 1]− µNλpiNL [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1] , (a.8)
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If m2 ≤ mˆ = m¯ (region 5) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [1− λ(1− σ)piNL ] [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− µλpiHL
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))
]− µλpiHN [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))]
+ µ(1− λ)piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ µNσ(1− λ)piNH
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)
]
,∀σ ∈ [0, 1], (a.9)
If mˆ ≤m2 and m¯ > m2, or If mˆ < m¯ < m2 (region 12) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µλpiHL [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))]
− µλpiHN
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
+ µ(1− λ)piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ µ(1− λ)piLN
[
εNu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]− µNλpiNL [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εNu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))] , (a.10)
If m¯ < mˆ ≤m2 (region 10) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µλpiHL [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))]
− µλpiHN
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
+ µ(1− λ)piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ µ(1− λ)piLN
[
εNu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ µN (1− λ)piNH
[
εNu
′
(
ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH )
)
− εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)
]
, (a.11)
If mˆ = m¯ ≤m2 (region 11) then,
ϕ
βϕˆ
= 1 + µ
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ µN [εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]− µλpiHL [εHu′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))]
− µλpiHN
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
+ µ(1− λ)piLH
[
εHu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ µ(1− λ)piLN
[
εNu
′ (ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]+ µN (1− λ)σpiNH [εNu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− εNu′ (ϕˆmˆ)]
− µNλpiNL
[
εNu
′ (ϕˆmˆ)− εNu′ (ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))
]
, ∀σ ∈ [0, 1], (a.12)
Proof. a) Region 1:
In this region, mˆ+ m˜ ≥ m∗+ 2m∗ and mˆ ≥ m∗, which altogether would lead to σ = 1 from Lemma
3. Then, the first derivative of (16) with respect to mˆ can be written as
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− βµpiHL
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ) +
∂χLH
∂mˆ
]
− βµpiHN
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ) +
∂χNH
∂mˆ
]
.
We need to obtain an expression for ∂χLH/∂mˆ. First, χLH = a¯LH (mˆ), from Lemma 2, where
a¯LH = (1− λ)εH [u(2q∗)− u(ϕˆmˆ)] + λϕˆ(2m∗ − mˆ). This leads to
∂χLH
∂mˆ
= −ϕˆεHu′(ϕˆmˆ) + λϕˆ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1] .
By the same reasoning, one can also obtain
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∂χNH
∂mˆ
= −ϕˆεHu′(ϕˆmˆ) + λϕˆ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1] .
Thus, Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) can be re-written as
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµ[1− λ(piHL + piHN )]
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1] .
The uniqueness of mˆ and a negative link between ϕ/βϕˆ and mˆ follow from the concavity of u.
b) Region 2 and 7:
Notice that: 1. In region 7, 2m∗ ≤ mˆ + m˜ < 2m∗ + m∗. So (L,H) and (L,N) pairs get the
first best, but not the (N,H) pair; 2. In region 2, 2m∗ + m˜ − m∗ ≤ mˆ + m˜ ≤ 2m∗ + m∗ such
that (L,H) and (L,N) pairs get the first best, but not the (N,H) pair; 3. min{mˆ} = m∗ since
2m∗ −m∗ = m∗ ≤ mˆ; 4. σ = 1 since mˆ ≥ m∗. Keeping these facts in mind, J can be written as
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµ[1− λpiHL ]
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµNpiNH (1− λ) [εNu′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− 1]
− βϕˆµpiHNλεH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
.
Note that at mˆ = 2m∗ − max{m˜ − m∗, 0}, (N,H) pairs get the first best. Thus,
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ)|mˆ=2m∗−max{m˜−m∗,0} = −[ϕ − βϕˆ] + βϕˆµ[1 − λ(piHL + piHN )] [εHu′[ϕˆmˆ]− 1]. Therefore,
no jump occurs at the border between regions 1 and 2. Finally, rearranging this gives rise to (a.2).
The uniqueness of mˆ and a negative link between ϕ/βϕˆ and mˆ are shown below (for region Y).
c) Region 8:
In this region: 1. (L,N) pairs get the first best; 2. (N,H) pairs never achieve the first best since
mˆ+ m˜ ≤ 2m∗−min{m˜,m∗}+ m˜ ≤ 2m∗+m∗; 3. Since m˜ < m∗, mˆ+ m˜ ≤ 2m∗. This implies that
(L,H) pairs do not get the first-best either; 4. Since mˆ ≥ m∗, σ = 1. Using these, one gets
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βµpiLH
[
∂χ˜LH
∂mˆ
− ϕˆ∂δˆLH
∂mˆ
]
+ βϕˆµNpiNH (1− λ)
[
εNu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− 1
]
− βϕˆµpiHNλεH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
+ βµpiHL
[
εHu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLH ))ϕˆ
(
1 +
∂δLH
∂mˆ
)
− εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ−
∂χLH
∂mˆ
]
.
where the 2nd line is adopted from the ones in region 2 and 7. Now, from the fact that
δ˜LH =mˆ,
χ˜
LH =a¯(m˜, mˆ) = (1− λ) [εHu(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− εHu(ϕˆm˜)] + λϕˆmˆ,
the followings must hold: ∂δ˜LH/∂mˆ = 1, ∂χ˜LH/∂mˆ = (1−λ)εHu′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))ϕˆ+λϕˆ. This replaces
the second component in the 1st-line with βϕˆµpiLH (1−λ) [εHu′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]. Also the fact that
δLH =m˜,
χ
LH =a¯(mˆ, m˜) = (1− λ) [εHu(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))− εHu(ϕˆmˆ)] + λϕˆm˜,
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can be used to replace the 3rd-line with −βϕˆµpiHLλεH [u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))]. Then,
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµpiLH (1− λ) [εHu′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ βϕˆµNpiNH (1− λ)
[
εNu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− 1
]
− βµpiHLλεH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜)))]
− βϕˆµpiHNλεH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
.
Note that at mˆ = 2m∗ − min{m˜,m∗}, Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) in region 8 equals to that in region 7, since
εHu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+m˜)) = 1. Therefore, no jump occurs at the border line between region 7 and 8. Finally,
rearranging this gives rise to (a.3). The uniqueness of mˆ and a negative link between ϕ/βϕˆ and mˆ
follow from fact that Jmˆmˆ(mˆ, σ) < 0:
Jmˆmˆ(mˆ, σ) =βϕˆ
2µεH [1− piHLλ− piHNλ]u′′(ϕˆmˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ βϕˆ2µpiHLλεHu
′′)(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜)) + βϕˆ2µpiHNλεHu
′′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))[1 +
∂δNH
∂mˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥−1
]
+ βϕˆ2µpiLH (1− λ)εHu′′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ)) + βϕˆ2µNpiNH (1− λ)εNu′′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))[1−
∂δ˜NH
∂mˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
] < 0.
The facts that ∂δNH/∂mˆ ≥ −1 and ∂δ˜NH/∂mˆ < 1 follow from the bargaining properties.
d) Region 3 or m¯ < mˆ ≤m∗ and m¯ > m3:
In this region: 1. mˆ ≤ m∗ but mˆ ≥ m¯ ⇒ → σ = 1; 2. If m˜ ≥ m∗ ⇒ 2m∗ ≤ mˆ + m˜ ⇒ (L,H)
and (L,N) pairs get the first-best. Further, (N,H) pairs do not get the first-best since mˆ ≤ m∗
and max{m˜} = 2m∗; 3. Region 8 disappears; 4. If m˜ < m∗, then region 3 disappears, thus only
(L,N) pairs get the first best; 5. 2m∗ −max{m˜,m∗} ≤ m∗. Given these facts, (a.4) follows easily.
Accordingly, there is no jump at mˆ = m∗, and the fact that ∂δ˜NH/∂mˆ < 1 follows from the analysis
for regions 2 and 7.
e) 2m∗−max{m˜,m∗} ≤ mˆ < m¯ :
This case is same as m¯ < mˆ ≤ m∗ and m¯ > m3, thus only (N,H) pairs do not achieve the first
best. But this time σ = 0. Then,
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµN
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµ [εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− βµNpiNL
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ+
∂χLN
∂mˆ
− ϕˆ
]
− βµpiHL
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ+
∂χLH
∂mˆ
]
+ βµpiHN
[
εHu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))ϕˆ
(
1 +
∂δNH
∂mˆ
)
− εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ−
∂χNH
∂mˆ
]
.
where the first component in the second line can be replaced by −βϕˆµNpiNLλ [εNu′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1] using
the fact that χLN = a¯(mˆ, m˜) = (1 − λ) [εNu(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))− εNu(ϕˆmˆ)] + λϕˆm˜. Finally, taking
advantage of the analysis for regions 2 and 7, one can obtain (a.5). Since mˆ < m¯ in this region,
the RHS of (a.5) at mˆ = m¯ is less than that of (a.4). This proves that there is a discontinuity of
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individual money demand at mˆ = m¯.
f) mˆ = m¯ : Region Y
This case is same as the ones in m¯ < mˆ ≤ m∗ and m¯ > m3 and 2m∗ − max{m˜,m∗} ≤ mˆ < m¯,
except for σ ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµN
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµ [εH (ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− βµNpiNL [εN (u(q∗)− u(ϕˆmˆ))− χLN ]
∂σ
∂mˆ
− βµN (1− σ)piNLλϕˆ
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ βϕˆµNσpiNHεN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))ϕˆ
(
1− ∂δ˜NH
∂mˆ
)
− u′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ+ ∂
χ˜
NH
∂mˆ
]
+ βµNpiNH
[
εN
(
u(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− u(ϕˆmˆ)
)
+ χ˜NH
] ∂σ
∂mˆ
− βµpiHLλϕˆ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
− βϕˆµpiHN εH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))ϕˆ
(
1 +
∂δNH
∂mˆ
)
+
∂χNH
∂mˆ
}
.
Now, from the proof of Lemma 3,
∂χNH
∂mˆ
=ϕˆ(1− λ)εH
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
+ ϕˆεHu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
∂δNH
∂mˆ
,
∂χ˜NH
∂mˆ
=− ϕˆλεN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ))
]
+ ϕˆεNu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))
∂δ˜NH
∂mˆ
.
These make the 3rd (5th) line equal to βϕˆµNσpiNH (1 − λ)εN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
(−βϕˆµpiHNλεH [u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))]). Then, using these facts along with the property that
piNLOTSS = piNHOTSB ⇒ σ ∈ [0, 1], one can obtain
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµN [1− λ(1− σ)piNL ]
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµ[1− λpiHL ] [εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ βϕˆµNσpiNH (1− λ)εN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
− βϕˆµpiHNλεH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
.
This gives rise to (a.6). Finally, we show that Jmˆmˆ(mˆ, σ)|mˆ=m¯ < 0 in order to prove the downward
sloping money demand curve within this region. By using the fact that ∂σ/∂mˆ, taking the second
derivative of the J function gives
Jmˆmˆ(mˆ, σ) =βϕˆ
2µεH [1− piHLλ− piHNλ]u′′(ϕˆmˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+βϕˆ2µpiHNλεHu
′′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))[1 +
∂δNH
∂mˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥−1
]
+ βϕˆ2µN [1− λ(1− σ)piNL − (1− λ)σpiNH ] εNu′′(ϕˆmˆ)
+ βσϕˆ2µNpiNH (1− λ)εNu′′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))[1−
∂δ˜NH
∂mˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
] < 0.
The facts that ∂δNH/∂mˆ ≥ −1 and ∂δ˜NH/∂mˆ < 1 follow from the bargaining properties.
g) Region 4 and 9:
Here we have: 1. σ = 1; 2. mˆ ≤ m∗; 3. mˆ + m˜ ≤ 2m∗ + m∗ so that (N,H) pairs never get the
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first best; 4. mˆ + m˜ ≤ 2m∗ so that (L,H) pairs never get the first best; 5. mˆ + m˜ ≥ m∗ so that
(L,N) pairs get the first best. These properties are the same as those in region 8, except that
mˆ ≤ m∗. This leads to (a.7), from which it is easy to see that there is no jump at mˆ = m∗ and
mˆ = 2m∗ −max {m˜,m∗}.
h) Region 6:
In terms of which pairs get the first best, this region has the same characteristics as regions 4 or 9,
except for δ˜ = 0. This leads to
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµN
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµ [εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ βµpiLH
[
∂χ˜LH
∂mˆ
− ϕˆ∂δ˜LH
∂mˆ
]
− βµNpiNL
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ+
∂χLN
∂mˆ
− ϕˆ
]
− βµpiHL
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ+
∂χLH
∂mˆ
− εHu′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLH ))ϕˆ(1 +
∂δLH
∂mˆ
)
]
+ βµpiHN
[
εHu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))ϕˆ
(
1 +
∂δNH
∂mˆ
)
− εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ−
∂χNH
∂mˆ
]
.
From region 8, the first term in the 2nd line can replace by βϕˆµpiLH (1− λ) [εHu′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1].
From the case where 2m∗ − max{m˜,m∗} ≤ mˆ < m¯, the 2nd term in the 2nd line is replaced by
−βϕˆµNpiNLλ [εNu′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]. From region 8, again, the 3rd and 4th lines, respectively, are replaced
by −βϕˆµpiHLλ [εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))] and −βϕˆµpiHNλ [εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))].
This leads to (a.8). Finally, notice that the RHS of (a.8) is just the sum of the RHS of (a.3)
and µN [εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1], and both of these are decreasing in mˆ. This proves why mˆ falls in ϕ/βϕˆ.
i) Region 5:
Here only (L,N) pairs get the first best and σ ∈ [0, 1]. This gives
Jmˆ(mˆ, σ)|mˆ=m¯ =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµN [1− λ(1− σ)piNL ]
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ βϕˆµ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµpiLH (1− λ) [εHu′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
− βϕˆµpiHLλ
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− εHu′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ m˜))
]
+ σβϕˆµNpiNH (1− λ)εN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
− βϕˆµpiHNλεH
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))
]
.
This gives (a.9). Moreover, we claim that Jmˆmˆ(mˆ, σ) < 0 in this region. The analysis for region Y
shows that 1st and 4th lines are decreasing in mˆ, and it is easy to see that the 2nd and 3rd lines
are also decreasing in mˆ. This proves that the individual money demand falls as the holding cost
increases in this region. Finally, it is straightforward to see that the RHS of (a.8) is less than that
of (a.9) at mˆ = m¯. This proves the discontinuity of the individual money demand at the borderline
between regions 6 and 5.
j) Region 12, or mˆ ≤m2 and m¯ > m2:
Here, σ = 0 and no pairs get the first best. Thus,
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Jmˆ(mˆ, σ) =− [ϕ− βϕˆ] + βϕˆµN
[
εNu
′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]+ βϕˆµ [εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)− 1]
+ βϕˆµpiLH (1− λ)
[
εHu
′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]+ βϕˆµpiLN (1− λ) [εNu′(ϕˆ(m˜+ mˆ))− 1]
+ βµNpiNL
[
εNu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))ϕˆ
(
1 +
∂δLN
∂mˆ
)
− εNu′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ−
∂χLN
∂mˆ
]
− βµpiHL
[
εHu
′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ+
∂χLH
∂mˆ
− εHu′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLH ))ϕˆ(1 +
∂δLH
∂mˆ
)
]
+ βµpiHN
[
εHu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δNH ))ϕˆ
(
1 +
∂δNH
∂mˆ
)
− εHu′(ϕˆmˆ)ϕˆ−
∂χNH
∂mˆ
]
.
Rearranging this gives rise to (a.10). Further, it is straightforward to show why mˆ falls in ϕ/βϕˆ
in this region, due to the concavity of u. Lastly, there is no jump in money demand at mˆ =
max {m∗ − m˜, 0}.
k) Region 10:
Just like region 12, no pairs get the first best in this region. However, here σ = 1. This makes
the optimality condition the same as the one for region 12, except for the last line in (a.11) which
captures the marginal benefit generated from pairs formed between the H and N types. Again,
the money demand decreases in the holding cost since 0 ≤ ∂δ˜NH/∂mˆ ≤ 1.
l) Region 11:
Again, no pairs get the first best in this region. However, here σ ∈ [0, 1]. This makes the optimality
condition, i.e., eq.(a.11), differ from those in regions 12 and 10 in terms of the marginal benefit
generated as the N -type. The fact that the money demand decreases in the holding cost follows
for the same reasons as in regions 10 and 12.
Corollary 2 The optimal choice for mˆ is unique, except for the case where mˆ = m¯, i.e., (a.6),
(a.9), and (a.12). The money demand function exhibits a discontinuity around the regions associated
with these three cases, thereby causing multiplicity of money demand within a certain range of
holding costs, namely, [1 + γ
l
, 1 + γ
h
] in Figure 1.
A.3 Proofs of Statements
Proof of Lemma 2.
The proof for Case 1 is equivalent to that for OTC bargaining solutions in Geromichalos and
Herrenbrueck (2012). Thus, we only provide a proof for Case 2. In the bargaining game between a
seller j and a buyer i, the Lagrangian function becomes
L = λ
{
εj [u (ϕ(m+ δ))− u (ϕm)] + ϕp(m)− ϕp(m+ δ)
+ εi [u (qi (m˜− δ))− u (qi(m˜))]− ϕpi (m˜− δ) + ϕpi(m˜)
}
+ τ
{
A− ϕδ + λ{εi [u (qi (m˜− δ))− u (qi(m˜))]− ϕpi (m˜− δ) + ϕpi(m˜)}
− (1− λ){εj [u (ϕ(m+ δ))− u (ϕm)] + ϕp(m)− ϕp(m+ δ)}
}
,
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where τ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the resource constraint, i.e., A ≥ χ, and χ is equivalent
to the one implied by the Kalai constraint. The corresponding FOC with respect to δ is given by
δ : 0 = λεju
′ (ϕ(m+ δ))ϕ− λϕ− λεiu′ (q(m˜− δ))) ∂q
∂(m˜− δ) + λϕ
∂p
∂(m˜− δ)
− τ
{
λ
[
εiu
′ (q(m˜− δ)) ∂q
∂(m˜− δ) − ϕ
∂p
∂(m˜− δ)
]
+ (1− λ) [εju′ (ϕ(m+ δ))ϕ− ϕ]+ ϕ
}
.
We analyze each case separately.
Case 1: τ = 0 ⇒ A > χ.
Sub-case 1.1: m˜− δ ≥ m∗i
If m˜ − δ ≥ m∗i , then the FOC gives λεju′ (ϕ(m+ δ))ϕ − λϕ = 0 ⇒ m + δ = m∗j . From the
assumption that m˜− δ ≥ m∗i ⇒ m˜+m ≥ m∗i +m∗j . From the Kalai constraint
χ = ϕ
(
m∗j −m
)
+ (1− λ){εj [u (q∗j )− u (q(m))]− ϕ(m∗j −m)} .
Sub-case 1.2: m˜− δ < m∗i
The FOC gives εju
′ (q(m+ δ)) = εiu′ (q(m˜− δ)). Since m+ δ < m∗j , m˜+m < m∗i +m∗j . This
is summarized as
δ =
{
δ¯ : εju
′ (q(m+ δ)) = εiu′ (q(m˜− δ))
}
,
χ =λεi
[
u (q(m˜))− u (q(m˜− δ¯))]+ (1− λ)εj [u (q(m+ δ¯))− u (q(m))] .
Case 2: τ > 0 ⇒ A = χ.
Sub-case 2.1: m˜− δ ≥ m∗i
The FOC becomes λεju
′ (q(m+ δ))ϕ − λϕ − τ(1 − λ) [εju′ (q(m+ δ))ϕ− ϕ] − τϕ = 0. After
some algebra it can be shown that
εju
′ (q(m+ δ)) =
λ(1 + τ)
λ(1 + τ)− τ > 1,
which implies m + δ ≤ m∗j . Furthermore, m˜ − δ ≥ m∗i , ∀δ, implies that m˜ −max{δ} ≥ m∗i when
δ ≤ m∗
j
−m. These facts imply that m˜+m ≥ m∗
i
+m∗
j
.
Now, χ = A and δ can be derived from χ satisfying the Kalai constraint. That is
δ =
{
δ : A = λϕδ + (1− λ)εj [u (q(m+ δ))− u (q(m))]
}
.
Lastly, from δ ≤ m∗
j
−m and χ in the Kalai constraint, the following condition must be met
A ≤ ϕ
(
m∗
j
−m
)
+ (1− λ)
{
εj
[
u(q∗
j
)− u (q(m))
]
− ϕ
(
m∗
j
−m
)}
.
Sub-case 2.2: m˜− δ < m∗i
The FOC becomes
43
0 =λεju
′ (q(m+ δ))ϕ− λϕεiu′(q(m˜− δ))
− τ {λ [εiu′ (q(m˜− δ))ϕ− ϕ]+ (1− λ){εju′ [q(m+ δ)]ϕ− ϕ}}− τϕ.
This FOC implies δ =
{
δ : εju
′(q(m+ δ)) > εiu′(q(m˜− δ))
}
. Therefore, m + δ < m∗
i
, which, in
turn, implies m˜+m < m∗
i
+m∗
j
. Now, the bargaining solution under this case is such that
χ =A,
δ =
{
δ : A = λεi [u(q(m˜))− u(q(m˜− δ))] + (1− λ)εj [u(q(m+ δ))− u(q(m))]
}
.
Lastly, δ < δ¯ due to the scarcity of assets. Therefore, the following condition must be met
A ≤ λεi
[
u(q(m˜))− u(q(m˜− δ¯))]+ (1− λ)εj [u(q(m+ δ¯))− u(q(m))] .
All these results can be summarized into the bargaining solution in Case 2.
Proof of Lemma 3.
By taking the first derivative of (16) with respect to σ,
Jσ(mˆ, σ) = −βµN [piNLSS − piNHSB ] .
Case a) is equivalent to Jσ(mˆ, σ) < 0, so that the optimal σ should be 0. Similar logic applies to
cases b) and c). Also, the threshold level is given by,
piNL
piNH
=
min {1, [1/(1− Σ)][(1− ν)µ]/µN }
min {1, [1/Σ][(1− ν)µ]/µN }
.
It is easy to see that piNL/piNH is non-decreasing in Σ. Lastly, we show why ∂λB/∂mˆ > 0 under
ϕˆmˆ ≤ q∗. First, it is easy to see that
∂SB
∂mˆ
= ϕˆεN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))
(
1− ∂δ˜NH
∂mˆ
)
− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
+
∂χ˜NH
∂mˆ
.
Given the optimal condition, i.e., equalization of the post-bargaining marginal DM utility in Lemma
2 under the case where A is fully abundant, the fact that ∂δNH/∂mˆ < 0 and ∂δ˜NH/∂mˆ > 0 is
straightforward. Second, from the bargaining solution we have χ˜NH = a¯NH (mˆ, m˜)
∂χ˜NH
∂mˆ
=ϕˆλεN
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))
]
+ ϕˆεNu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))
∂δ˜NH
∂mˆ
,
∂SB
∂mˆ
=ϕˆεN (1− λ)
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ− δ˜NH ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
> 0.
Similarly, one can also show that
∂SS
∂mˆ
= ϕˆεN
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))
(
1 +
∂δLN
∂mˆ
)
− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
− ∂
χ
LN
∂mˆ
.
Also, from the the bargaining solution that χLN = a¯LN (m˜, mˆ)
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∂χLN
∂mˆ
=− ϕˆ(1− λ)εN
[
u′(ϕˆmˆ)− u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))
]
+ ϕˆεNu
′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))
∂δLN
∂mˆ
,
∂SS
∂mˆ
=ϕˆεNλ
[
u′(ϕˆ(mˆ+ δLN ))− u′(ϕˆmˆ)
]
< 0.
This proves why ∂λB/∂mˆ > 0 under ϕˆmˆ < q
∗.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Define G(Σ) ≡ λBpiNH (Σ) − piNL(Σ), and recall that d ≡ (1 − ν)µ/µN < 1, due to the fact
that µ < 1/3. We first show that G′(Σ) ≤ 0, ∀Σ ∈ [0, 1]. We look at two cases: 1. d > 1/2; 2.
d ≤ 1/2. In the first case, d > 1 − d. Thus, there are three sub-cases regarding the value of Σ. If
1 − d < Σ < d, then piNH = ν and piNL = ν. If Σ < 1 − d, then piNH = ν and piNL = νd/(1 − Σ).
Lastly, if d < Σ, then piNH = νd/Σ and piNL = ν. In the second case, where d ≤ 1 − d, there are
again three sub-cases. If Σ < d, then piNH = ν and piNL = ν/d(1 − Σ). If d < Σ < 1 − d, then
piNH = νd/Σ and piNL = νd/(1−Σ). If 1− d < Σ, then piNH = ν and piNL = ν. Using the fact that
λB is independent of Σ, one can easily verify G
′(Σ) ≤ 0, ∀Σ ∈ [0, 1] and ∀d ∈ (0, 1).
Next, given that G′(Σ) ≤ 0, ∀Σ ∈ [0, 1] and ∀d ∈ (0, 1), one can show that σ = 0 if G(0) ≤ 0.
Likewise, if G(1) ≥ 0, then σ = 1. Then, using the results above, G(0) = λBν − dν and G(1) =
λBdν − ν, ∀d ∈ (0, 1). Thus, σ = 0 if λB ≤ d, ∀d ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, σ = 1 if λB ≥ 1/d, ∀d ∈ (0, 1).
This proves that ∃!Σ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Σ < Σ¯ ⇒ σ = 1, Σ = Σ¯ ⇒ σ ∈ [0, 1], Σ > Σ¯ ⇒ σ = 0.
This explains Figure 2. In addition, from 0 = λBpiNH (Σ¯)− piNL(Σ¯)
∂Σ¯
∂λB
= − piNH(Σ¯)
λBpi
′
NH
(Σ¯)− pi′
NL
(Σ¯)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that pi′
NH(Σ¯)
≤ 0 and pi′
NL
(Σ¯) ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ (0, 1). Lastly,
the fact that ∂λB (Z)/∂Z > 0, ∀λB (Z) ∈ R+ follows from the proof for Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Let the equilibrium λB be denoted as λB (Z, εN , λ). We first show that ∂λB/∂λ < 0, when Z < q
∗
(we call it property 1). In equilibrium where Z < q∗, ∂SS/∂λ = −∂χLN /∂λ, which is the same as
{εNu(2Z)− 2Z} − {εNu(Z)− Z} > 0. Likewise, ∂SB/∂λ = ∂χ˜NH/∂λ, since ϕδ˜NH ≡ η˜NH in equi-
librium does not depend on λ. Thus, the former should be equal to εN (u(Z)− u(Z − η˜NH )− u(Z)),
which, in turn, is equal to the negative value of the total OTC surplus generated in the (N,H) pair
in equilibrium. This proves that ∂λB/∂λ < 0 when Z < q
∗.
Next, recall from Lemma 3 that ∂λB/∂Z > 0, when Z < q
∗ (we call it property 2). This proves
that Z¯
l
< Z¯
h
. Then, from properties 1,2, ∂Z¯i/∂λ > 0, ∀i ∈ {l, h}. Now, it can be shown that
lim
α→0
λB (q
∗ − α, εN , λ) =
SB (q
∗ − α, εN , λ)
SS (q
∗ − α, εN , λ)
=∞,
lim
α→q∗ λB (q
∗ − α, εN , λ) =
SB (q
∗ − α, εN , λ)
SS (q
∗ − α, εN , λ)
= 0,
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for all λ and εN . We call it property 3. The three properties taken together, indicate that ∃!α ∈
(0, q∗) such that λB (q
∗−α, εN , λ) = 1/d, ∀λ, εN . Combining this result with the fact that ∂λB/∂λ <
0, when Z < q∗, one can finally show that sup{Z¯h} = q∗.
Finally, if sup{Z¯h} = q∗, then λB (q∗) > 1/d, and since ∂λB/∂Z > 0 for Z < q∗, the MSNE
prevails.
Derivation of the W function in Section 4.2.1.
The first thing to notice is that the equilibrium CM consumption and work effort will differ
among agents with different trading histories. For instance, an L-type who traded in the OTC
carries less money than an L-type agent who did not match with anyone, so the former will have to
work harder to rebalance her portfolio. Further, N -type agents who traded in OTC under Z > q∗
might carry more real balances than H-types who traded in the OTC under the same condition.
Moreover, the equilibrium CM consumption and work hours will also differ among producers,
depending on the type of agent with whom they traded. For instance, a producer who traded with
an N -type agent will enter the CM with fewer real balances than a producer who traded with an
H-type agent. Therefore, there are potentially several possibilities.
We divide the various possibilities as follows. First, we let Xi,j (Hi,j ), i ∈ {H,N,L} and j ∈
{H,N,L, o} (where o denotes no one) denote the equilibrium CM consumption (work effort) for
the agent type i who met with the agent type j in OTC. Likewise, we let XP
i,j
, i ∈ {H,N,L} denote
the equilibrium CM consumption of a producer who matched with a type i agent, who, in turn,
matched with a type j agent in the OTC. Note that XP
i,j
= qP
i,j
. The latter denotes the amount
of LW goods produced. This equality holds true due to TIOLI offer within the LW market. Also
note that µij denotes the measure of types i who met types j in the OTC.
Let CC denote the total net CM utilities of (all) agents. Then, using the LW bargaining
solutions, we obtain
CC =− µNH
{
Z −max{0, qH,N − 2q∗}}− µLH {Z −max{0, qH,L − 2q∗}}− (1− µNH − µLH )Z
− µNH
{
Z −max{0, qN,H − q∗}}− µLN {Z −max{0, qN,L − q∗}}−min {Z, q∗} (1− µNH − µLN )
− µLH
{
Z −max{0, qL,H − 0}}− µLN {Z −max{0, qL,N − 0}}−min {Z, 0} (1− µNH − µLN ) .
Next, let CP denote the total net CM utilities of (all) producers. Then using H = 0 for producers
in equilibrium we get
CP = µNH
(
XP
H,N
− 0
)
+ µLH
(
XP
H,L
− 0
)
+ (1− µNH − µLH )
(
XP
H,o
− 0
)
+ µNH
(
XP
N,H
− 0
)
+ µLN
(
XP
N,L
− 0
)
+ (1− µNH − µLN )
(
XP
N,o
− 0
)
+ µLH
(
XP
L,H
− 0
)
+ µLN
(
XP
L,N
− 0
)
+ (1− µLH − µLN )
(
XP
L,o
− 0
)
,
Using the fact that XP
i,j
= qP
i,j
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CP = µNH min
{
qH,N , 2q
∗}+ µLH min{qH,L , 2q∗}+ (1− µNH − µLH ) min {2q∗, Z}
+ µNH min
{
qN,H , q
∗}+ µLN min{qN,L , q∗}+ (1− µNH − µLN ) min {q∗, Z} .
Finally, using the stationary equilibrium property that qH,N + qN,H = 2Z, qH,L + qL,H = 2Z,
qL,N + qN,L = 2Z, and after some algebra, we can show that
CC + CP = 0.
Therefore, the welfare function only depends on total net LW utilities of agents, and these
utilities are different for the various types, depending on their trading histories in the OTC. By
letting LWC denote the total net LW utilities, one can obtain
LWC = µNH [εHu (min {Z, 2q∗)})−min {Z, 2q∗}+ λSNH (Z)]
+ µLH [εHu (min {Z, 2q∗)})−min {Z, 2q∗}+ λSLH (Z)]
+ (µ− µNH − µLH ) [εHu (min {Z, 2q∗})−min {Z, 2q∗}]
+ µNH [εNu (min {Z, q∗)})−min {Z, q∗}+ (1− λ)SNH (Z)]
+ µLN [εNu (min {Z, q∗)})−min {Z, q∗}+ λSLN (Z)]
+ (µN − µNH − µLN ) [εNu (min {Z, q∗})−min {Z, q∗}]
+ µLH (1− λ)SLH (Z) + µLN (1− λ)SLN (Z).
Note that the first line captures the LW utilities by H-type agents who met with the N -type in the
OTC (with a measure equal to µNH ). The second and third lines can be explained similarly. The
difference is that the second (third) line refers to H-type agents who met with L-types (nobody)
in the OTC. The next three lines can be similarly understood as they capture for N -type agents’
LW utilities. The last line does the same for L-types. Equation (17) follows after some algebra.
Proof of Lemma 6.
Since (a) is straightforward we only prove the case where Z < q∗. From the steady state welfare
function, one can define
W(Σ|Z) = µν(1− ν) min
{
Σ
d
, 1
}
SNH (Z) + µν(1− ν) min
{
1− Σ
d
, 1
}
SLN (Z) + C,
where C is a constant.
Case 1: d ≥ 1/2.
If Σ < 1− d then, W ′(Σ|Z) = µν(1− ν)/dSNH (Z) > 0.
If 1−d ≤ Σ ≤ d then,W ′(Σ|Z) = µν(1− ν)/d [SNH (Z)− SLN (Z)] > 0, where the last inequality
follows from the fact that ∂λB/∂Z > 0 (from Lemma 4) and that the proportional bargaining
ensures SNH (Z) > SLN (Z).
If d < Σ then, W ′(Σ|Z) = −µν(1− ν)/dSLN (Z) < 0.
Case 2: d < 1/2.
If Σ < d, then W ′(Σ|Z) = µν(1− ν)/dSLH (Z) > 0.
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If d ≤ Σ ≤ 1− d, then W ′(Σ|Z) = 0.
If 1− d < Σ, then W ′(Σ|Z) = −µν(1− ν)/dSLN (Z) < 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We prove this proposition by considering two different cases.
Case A: q∗/2 < Z¯l < Z¯h < q∗
First, recall that Σ(Z
∗
) = D ≥ 1/2. Then, from (17)
W ′(Z) = µ [εHu′(Z)− 1]+ µN [εNu′(Z)− 1]+ νµS′LH (Z) + µNH (Σ)S′NH (Z)
+ µ′
LN
(Σ)
∂Σ
∂Z
SLN (Z) + µLN (Σ)S
′
LN
(Z), (a.13)
where µLN (Σ) = µN ν(1−Σ) and µ′LN (Σ) = −µN ν. Now, SLH (Z) = εH [u(Z + η)− u(Z)]− η˜, and
since (L,H) pairs never get the first best in this region, η = Z˜ and η˜ = Z˜. Thus, in equilibrium
SLH (Z) = εH [u(2Z)− u(Z)]− Z. This yields
S′
LH
(Z) = εH
[
2u′(2Z)− u′(Z)]− 1 < 0.
We have
S′
NH
(Z) = (1− λ)εN
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]− λεH [u′(Z)− u′(Z + ηNH )] ,
where η is such that εHu
′(Z+η) = εNu
′(Z−η). Note that the sign of S′
NH
(Z) is ambiguous. Lastly,
(L,N) pairs get the first best. Thus, SLN (Z) = εN [u(q
∗)− u(Z)] − η˜, where η˜ = ϕδ˜ = q∗ − Z.
Then, we have S′
LN
(Z) = − [εNu′(Z)− 1] < 0.
Now, we solve for (∂Σ/∂Z)SLN (Z). First, using the equilibrium condition piNL(Σ)λSLN (Z) =
piNH (Σ)(1− λ)SNH (Z), one can obtain
∂Σ
∂Z
SLN (Z) =
∂Σ
∂Z
SNH (Z)
piNH (Σ)
piNL(Σ)
1− λ
λ
.
Next, from Lemma 3, we have piNL(Σ)− λB(mˆ)piNH (Σ) = 0. Then,
∂Σ
∂mˆ
=
∂Σ
∂λB
∂λB(mˆ)
∂m
,
∂Σ
∂λB
=
piNH (Σ)
−λB(mˆ)pi′NH (Σ)
, (a.14)
∂λB (mˆ)
∂mˆ
= S′
B
(mˆ) [SS (mˆ)]
−1 − SB (mˆ)
S′
S
SS (mˆ)
2
.
Next, we use the following facts to simplify piNL(Σ) and piNH (Σ): If d ≥ 1/2 → D = d ≥ 1/2 and
Σ ≥ D → Σ ≥ 1− d. Thus, piNL(Σ) = ν and piNH (Σ) = νd/Σ. If d ≤ 1/2 → D = 1− d ≥ 1/2 and
Σ > D. Thus, d ≥ 1− Σ → piNL(Σ) = ν and piNH (Σ) = νd/Σ. Then, eq.(a.14) can be rewritten as
∂Σ
∂λB
=
piNH (Σ)
−λB(mˆ)pi′NH (Σ)
=
Σ
λB (mˆ)
Thus, in equilibrium,
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∂Σ
∂Z
= Σ
[
S′
B
(Z)
SB (Z)
− S
′
S
(Z)
SS (Z)
]
,
and, using Lemma 4,
∂Σ
∂Z
SLN (Z) =
∂Σ
∂Z
SNH (Z)
piNH (Σ)
piNL(Σ)
1− λ
λ
= Σ
[
SS (Z)
SB (Z)
S′
B
(Z)
λ
− S
′
S
(Z)
λ
]
=
Σ
λ
[
d
Σ
S′
B
(Z)− S′
S
(Z)
]
,
=
d
λ
εN (1− λ)
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]− Σ
λ
εNλ
[
u′(Z + ηLN )
(
1 +
∂ηLN
∂Z
)
− u′(Z)
]
,
=
d
λ
εN (1− λ)
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]
+
Σ
λ
λ
[
εNu
′(Z)− 1] ,
where the 2nd line exploits the fact that Σ > D ≥ 1/2 in equilibrium, and the last line uses the
fact that (L,N) pairs get the first best here.
Next, substituting the above equation into (a.13) leads to
W ′(Z) = µ [εHu′(Z)− 1]+ µN [εNu′(Z)− 1]− νµ [εHu′(Z)− εH2u′(2Z)]− νµ− νµN [εNu′(Z)− 1]
− µN νd(1− λ)εN
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]
[(1− λ)/λ]− µN νdλεH
[
u′(Z)− u′(Z + ηNH )
]
.
(a.15)
This proves Proposition 1. Thus, case 1 characterizes a situation where the maximum of the first
line in the RHS of (a.15), attained at Z = Z
∗
, is always lower than the minimum of the absolute
value of the remaining terms on the RHS of (a.15), attained at Z = Z¯h. Case 4 is straightforward
and explained in the text. The proofs for cases 2 and 3 follow naturally from the fact that G and
F¯ are continuous and decreasing in Z.
Case B: Z¯l < Z¯h < q
∗/2
In this case, no pair can get the first best. Then, only SLN (Z) differs compared to Case A. Here,
SLN (Z) = εN [u(2Z)− u(Z)] − η˜ and S′LN (Z) = εN [2u′(2Z)− u′(Z)] − 1 < 0, where we used the
fact that η˜NL = Z in equilibrium. Further, as in Case A,
∂Σ
∂Z
SLN (Z) =
d
λ
εN (1− λ)
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]− Σ
λ
εNλ
[
u′(Z + ηLN )
(
1 +
∂ηLN
∂Z
)
− u′(Z)
]
,
=
d
λ
εN (1− λ)
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]− Σ
λ
εNλ
[
2u′(2Z)− u′(Z)] ,
Then, eq.(a.15) becomes
W ′(Z) = µ [εHu′(Z)− 1]+ µN [εNu′(Z)− 1] (a.16)
− νµ [εHu′(Z)− εH2u′(2Z)]− νµ+ νµN [εN 2u′(2Z)− εNu′(Z)]− νµN (1− Σ)
− µN νd(1− λ)εN
[
u′(Z − ηNH )− u′(Z)
]
[(1− λ)/λ]− µN νdλεH
[
u′(Z)− u′(Z + ηNH )
]
.
Note that the second line in the RHS of (a.16) becomes negative, since εHu
′(Z) − εH2u′(2Z) is
positive due to the concavity of u. The condition described in case 1 guarantees that the maximum
of the first line in the RHS of (a.16), attained at Z = Z
∗
, is always less than the minimum of the
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absolute value of the remaining terms in the RHS of (a.16), attained at Z = Z¯h and Σ = 0. The
rest of proofs follows the same steps as in Case A.
Proof of Proposition 2.
ψLH : Note that ψLH = min {2q∗ − Z,Z} /a¯(Z) in regions 1 and 2. Also, min {2q∗ − Z,Z} = 2q∗−Z
in these regions, and a¯(Z) = (1−λ) [εHu(2q∗)− εHu(Z)] +λ (2q∗ − Z). Further, εHu(2q∗)− 2q∗ >
εH−Z, due to the concavity of u. Combining this with the fact that ψLH = min {2q∗ − Z,Z} /a¯(Z)
ensures that the OTC prices are always less than 1. Next, ∂ψ/∂Z can be rewritten as
∂ψ
∂Z
=
(1− λ)εH
[a¯(Z)]2
[
(2q∗ − Z)u′(Z)− (u(2q∗)− u(Z))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 due to the concavity
> 0. (a.17)
Thus, ∂ψ/∂γ < 0 in these regions.
Now, consider a region Z¯h < Z < q
∗. Here, (L,H) pairs do not get the first best. Thus,
∂ψ
∂Z
=
(1− λ)εH [(u(2Z)− u(Z))− Z [2u′(2Z)− u′(Z)]]
[a¯(Z)]2
> 0,
which uses the fact that a¯(Z) = (1−λ)εH [u(2Z)− u(Z)] +λZ, and the inequality follows from the
concavity of u, which makes the numerator in the RHS positive.
When Z < Z¯h, the OTC price behaves qualitatively the same as in the case where Z¯h < Z < q
∗,
since (L,H) pairs do not get the first best either. The only difference is that the elasticity of the
OTC price with respect to inflation gets lower, because the elasticity of money demand gets lower
when inflation goes up.
ψLN : Note that no (L,N) matches are formed for γ ≤ γ3 because N -types always enter the OTC
as buyers. For γ > γ3 , there are two possible cases: Z¯h > q
∗/2 and Z¯h ≤ q∗/2. In the latter, (L,N)
pairs never get the first best. Thus,
∂ψ
∂Z
=
(1− λ)εN [(u(2Z)− u(Z))− Z [2u′(2Z)− u′(Z)]]
[a¯(Z)]2
> 0,
which uses the fact that a¯(Z) = (1− λ)εN [u(2Z)− u(Z)] + λZ, and the inequality comes from the
concavity of u. Note that these results are the same as the ones in the (L,H) pair (except from
the fact that the term εH appears in that case). If γ is such that Z < q
∗/2, the effect of inflation
on ψLN is identical to the one on ψLH , analyzed earlier. If γ is such that Z ≥ q∗/2, then
ψ =
q∗ − Z
(1− λ) [εNu(q∗)− εNu(Z)]
,
and one could obtain ∂ψ/∂Z > 0, as in the (L,H) case.
Lastly, it is easy to show that ψLN > ψLH since
εH [u(2q
∗)− u(Z)]
2q∗ − Z >
εN [u(q
∗)− u(Z)]
q∗ − Z ,
u′(q∗)
u′(2q∗)
>
[u(q∗)− u(Z)] /(q∗ − Z)
[u(2q∗)− u(Z)) /(2q∗ − Z) ,
where the second inequality holds since εHu
′(2q∗) = εNu
′(q∗).
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ψNH : In region 1, (N,H) pairs get the first best so that ψNH = ψLH . Outside region 1, (N,H) pairs
never get the first best. Thus, ψ = η¯/ {(1− λ)εH [u(Z + η¯)− u(Z)}+ λεN [u(Z)− u(Z − η¯)]} ,
where εNu
′(Z − η¯) = εHu′(Z + η¯). Notice that ψNH 6= ψLH in general. Also, using the implicit
function theorem, ∂η¯/∂Z = {εNu′′(Z − η¯)− εHu′′(Z + η¯)} / {εNu′′(Z − η¯) + εHu′′(Z + η¯)} , which
is in the set [0, 1] under u′′′(Z) > 0, and ambiguous otherwise.
Furthermore, notice that
∂ψ
∂Z
= (1− λ)εH
{
∂η¯
∂Z
[u(Z + η¯)− u(Z)]− η¯
[
u′(Z + η¯)
(
1 +
∂η¯
∂Z
)
− u′(Z)
]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ λεN
{
∂η¯
∂Z
[u(Z)− u(Z − η¯)]− η¯
[
u′(Z)− u′(Z − η¯)
(
1− ∂η¯
∂Z
)]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
,
and we have A > 0 and B > 0 always, since
∂η¯
∂Z
[
u(Z + η¯)− u(Z)
η¯
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>u′(Z+η¯)
> u′(Z + η¯)− u′(Z) + u′(Z + η¯) ∂η¯
∂Z
,
∂η¯
∂Z
[
u(Z)− u(Z − η¯)
η¯
]
> u′(Z)− u′(Z − η¯) + u′(Z − η¯) ∂η¯
∂Z
,
⇒ u′(Z − η¯)− u′(Z) > ∂η¯
∂Z︸︷︷︸
<1
u′(Z − η¯)− u(Z)− u(Z − η¯)η¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
>u′(Z)
 .
This proves that ∂ψ/∂γ < 0 when the LW utility function has a positive third derivative. Otherwise,
it is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 3.
VHL : VHL = µν(2q
∗ − Z) for γ < γ2 , and it equals µνZ for γ > γ2 .
VNH : For γ < γ1 , VNH = µν(1− ν)(2q∗−Z), which implies ∂VNH/∂γ > 0. For γ1 < γ < γ4 , VNH =
µν(1− ν)η¯(Z), which implies ∂VNH/∂γ > 0, only if u′′′ > 0. For γ4 < γ, VNH = µν(1− ν)Σ/dη¯(Z),
hence, ∂VNH/∂γ > 0, only if u
′′′ > 0.
VLN : For γ < γ3 , VLN = 0. For γ3 < γ < γ˜, VLN = µν(1−ν)(1−Σ)/d(q∗−Z), so that ∂VLN /∂γ > 0.
For γ˜ < γ < γ4 or γ3 < γ < γ4 if γ3 > γ˜ ⇒VLN = µν(1−ν)(1−Σ)/d(q∗−Z), so that ∂VLN /∂γ > 0
(∂VLN /∂γ < 0) if (1 − Σ) < ZΣ′(Z) ((1 − Σ) > ZΣ′(Z)). For γ > γ4 , VLN = µν(1 − ν)Z, hence,
∂VLN /∂γ < 0.
Total Trade Volume
(a), (b), and (c) are obvious from the analysis so far. For γ3 < γ < γ˜, V = µν(1− ν)η¯(Z) + µνZ +
νµN (1−Σ)(q∗−Z), hence, ∂V/∂γ is ambiguous but positive as µ approaches zero. For γ˜ < γ < γ4
or γ3 < γ < γ4 , under γ3 > γ˜, we have V = µν(1 − ν)η¯(Z) + µνZ + µν(1 − ν)((1 − Σ)/d − Z/d),
hence, ∂V/∂γ is ambiguous.
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